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Abstract of the thesis
Since the second half of this century, there has been a
revival of interest in grand theory in the realm of Western
political philosophy. In this movement, classical liberalism is
the most prominent protagonist.
F. A. Hayek, the nobel laureate, has contributed one of the
most profound and orginial theories in this revival of classical
liberalism. He not only develops the philosophical contributions
of those classical thinkers such as Kant, Hume, and Adam Smith, but
also integrates them with his own discoveries in economics,
psychology, jurisprudence, and philosophy of science.
Hayek believes that an adequate defence of liberalism must
start with a pausible conception of human reason. Also, the way
how social order is emerged and evolved is essential to account for
why individual libert iq imnnrtant
For the past twenty years, Hayek has concentrated in the
development of his theory of spontaneous order. The importance of
this theory not only lies in its attempt to give a foundation to
liberalism; also, this theory is a point of convergence in Hayek's
wide range of scholarship.
Despite this, Hayek's contribution to classical liberalism is
relatively neglected by students of social and political
philosophy. Not until recently do we see serious studies on his
theory have been made.
This thesis attempts to achieve a dual task.
Firstly, it-tries to elucidate Hayek's theory of spontaneous
order and to show how it defends individual freedom.
I shall try to point out that the theory of spontaneous order
is both an explanatory and a normative theory.
As an explanatory theory, it rests on two important
assumptions: the ignorance thesis and the evolution thesis.
The ignorance thesis challenges the validity of Cartesian
rationalism and argues that there are certain logical and practical
limitations in human reason. Thus, a complete understanding and
control of social phenomena is impossible.
The evolution thesis accounts for how social order can be
formed without a unifying plan and supports the claim that social
institution is a result of human action but not of human design.
At the normative level, the theory of spontaneous order
requires another thesis, viz., the law of liberty. Hayek argues
that in order to maintain the development of a spontaneous order,
the elements within it must follow some rules with distinctive
attributes. Also, in case of rule conflicts, some required tests
have to be satisfied. It is only through these rules and tests
that a snnntanenus order gets a determinate character.
Secondly,I shall argue in this dissertation that though
Hayek's theory is insightful and significant, it is unsuccessful.
I shall claim that there have some tensions between the
required tests of the theory of spontaneous order which make it
ambiguous in terms of rule resolution. This in turn makes the
tests themsevlves subject to different interpretations which are
not compatible with individual freedom.
Furthermore, liberalism, by justifying market economy,has to
justify unequal socio-economic distribution. This state of affairs
makes the claim of equal liberty for all by liberalism dubious.
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F.A.Hayek, the Nobel laureate in economics, is one of those
few eminent thinkers in this century whose scholarship covers a
wide range of important areas with contemporary significance ye
itself forms a coherent and profound system of ideas.1
Hayek's contributions to economic science have scarcely been
doubted.2 His undertakings in jurisprudence,3 psychology,4 history5
and the philosophy of science and social sciences,6 though at times
neglected or disputed, are in general received by the academic
world with respect. However, it is not until recently that his
general philosophy has been thoroughly examined-by scholars;7 and
his, perhaps, most important contribution to social and political
philosophy in the tradition of classical liberalism---the theory of
spontaneous order---has largely been neglected but until lately.8
To assess the general philosophy of Hayek is by no means an
easy task. It is not the intention of this author, nor dare I
claim I possess the competence, to evaluate Hayek's overall
scholarship. But as a student of social and political philosophy,
Hayek's theory of spontaneous order stands somewhat as a hurdle or
challenge inviting responses and appraisals.
It seems to me that despite the wide range and profoundity of
2Introduction Chapter One
Hayek's scholarship, many of his defences of liberty are derived
from his major insights in economics, psychology, philosophy,
politics, and methodology over the years which are all converged in
his theory of spontaneous order in a coherent, persuasive, and
provocative manner. Thus, a systematic and critical treatise on
this very theory seems inevitable for an assessment and
understanding of the strength and weakness of Hayek's liberalism.
There is a further reason for this undertaking. The fact that
Hayek's academic works cover a wide range of areas renders an
adequate understanding of his defences of liberty difficult. It
has been recognised by many scholars that Hayek's works are by no
means easy to understand.9 I find that many attacks launched by his
critics are untenable chiefly because they fail to appreciate the
strength of Hayek's theory of spontaneous order.10 I hope,
therefore, that in this dissertation, I can succeed in accounting
adequately the theory of spontaneous order before a critical
evaluation is made.
Before proceeding to the detailed treatise, I think, perhaps
an outline of the major arguments in this dissertation is useful tc
readers.
I regard Hayek's theory of spontaneous order as both
explanatory and normative. As an explanatory theory, it mainly
rests on two fundamental insights: that human knowledge is
necessarily tainted by human experience making a transcendental
standpoint on human thought impossible on the ground that mind and
society develop concurrently. This insight enables Hayek to
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conclude that it is logically and practically impossible for the
human mind to develop all social institutions afresh. I shall call
this the ignorance thesis of his theory of spontaneous order.
Secondly, social development must necessarily be evolutionary in
the sense of trial and error. Man cannot positively determine the
nature and consequences of social evolution, nor can man find any
law of evolution social evolution proceeds largely
unintentionally. Successful or useful social practices and
institutions will be imitated, transmitted and retained.
Unsuccessful ones will be abandoned or will lead to the downfall or
destruction of the groups that refuse to give them up. External or
exogenous interferences of this evolutionary process will disturb
the normal selective function of it and render it more ineffective
and inefficient, or, at worst, chaotic. This is, as I shall call
it, the evolution thesis of the theory of spontaneous order.
At the normative level, however, the theory of spontaneous
order requires a third thesis: viz., the law of liberty. To Hayek,
the maintenance and improvement of a spontaneous social order
depends on the elements within this order to follow some
conventional or normative rules. These rules possess certain
attributes, generality, equality, for instances, which enable the
perpetuation of the order. If we treasure the effectiveness and
efficiency of spontaneous order, these rules must be followed
unconditionally which define the very domain of individual freedom.
But these rules only constitute certain necessary conditions for
the social order its sufficient condition we may never know.
If Hayek is correct, we can in the evolutionary process of
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winnowing and slrting social practices eliminate those practices or
rules which are opposite to the law of liberty and, thus,
negatively defend individual freedom. In other words, though human
ignorance renders us impossible to create spontaneous order by
design, we can eliminate those practices which are necessarily
detrimental to individual freedom.
It is this thought-provoking contention that I propose to
challenge. I shall argue that this contention is self-defeating
because it, in the final analysis, rests on a question-begging
argument.
A deeper investigation into Hayek's question-begging argument
also reveals that the whole theory of spontaneous order is flawed
by .the conflict between Hayek's rationalist and sceptical
assumptions which are embedded simultaneously in his theory. I
believe that this is the central question of Hayek's social and
political philosophy that makes his defence of freedom dubious.
My second criticism is based on my first challenge. Since
Hayek's failure to resolve the tensions between his rationalist and
sceptical assumptions in the theory of spontaneous order deprives
him any clear final criterion for evaluation of social evolution,
it becomes difficult to defend individual freedom in the context of
unequal distribution of socio-economic goods and services which is
endorsed by him. This is serious because it becomes unclear
whether the law of liberty, which is claimed to be an instrument of
protecting and promoting spontaneous social order where unequal
distributions of socio-economic goods and services are permitted,
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is in fact protecting freedom or safeguarding efficiency even at
the expense of freedom.
In saying so, I am not contending that Hayek's defence of
liberty has in no way promoted the cause of freedom. I admit that
many of his suggestions regarding democratic institutions of the
Western countries are important to the cause of freedom. Also, his
contention against central synoptic planning is useful for the
protection of freedom. What I am arguing is that his philosophical
justification of liberty is, in the final resort- nnciirrocQf1
I hope my undertaking here can bring more clarity to the
philosophy of Hayek and help assess its strength and weakness.
Now, I must delay no more my exposition of Hayek's theory of
spontaneous order.
6The Ignorance Thesis Chapter Two
CHAPTER TWO
HAYEK' S THEORY OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER
THE IGNORANCE THESIS
Reason
In chapter one of the first volume of his latest trilogy---
Law, Legislation and Liberty ,1 Hayek has systematically and
precisely summed up his insights in epistemology of the past
thirty-five years or more.2 One of the main themes in that chapter
is a critique of the Cartesian conception of rPacnn 3
To Hayek, Descartes defined reason as logical deduction from
explicit premises anything which could not be logically derived
from explicit premises that were "clear and distinct", and
therefore beyond possible doubt, was rejected as untrue.
This conception of reason, when applied to human action, will
assume that only actions which are determined entirely by known and
demonstrable truth are rational. Any action which fails to be
explicitly demonstrable is not rationl; this kind of actions, even
if it leads to success in human undertakings, must not be accepted
as reasonable, its success is accidental rather than necessary.
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in addition to this, Descartes seems to suggest that rational
activities are much more superior to non-rational activities. And
rational activities are the products of rational designs which are,
often, undertaken according to one single plan or even under one
single mind. In his classic A Discourse on Method, Descartes
writes the following which deserves reproduction here:
Of these [Descartes was recalling his experience
in Germany in the text] one of the very first that
occured to me was, that there is seldom so much
_perfection in works composed of many separate
parts, upon which different hands had been
employed, as in those completed by a single mind.
Thus it is observable that the buildings which a
single architect has planned and executed, are
generally more elegant and commodious than those
which several have attempted to improve, by making
old walls serve for purposes for which they were
not originally built. Thus also, those ancient
cities which, from being at first only villages,
have become, in course of time, large towns, are
usually but ill laid out compared with the
regularly constructed towns which a professional
architect has freely planned on an open plain so
that although the several buildings of the former
may often equal or surpass in beauty those of the
latter, yet when one observes their indiscriminate
juxtapositon, there a large one and here a small,
and the consequent crookedness and irregularity of
the streets, one is disposed to allege that chance
rather than any human will guided by reason must
have led to such an arrangement... .In the same
way I fancied that those nations which, starting
from a semi-barbarious state and advancing to
civilisation by slow degrees, have had their laws
successively determined, and, as it were, forced
upon them simply by experience of the hurtfulness
of particular crimes and disputes, would in this
process come to be possessed of less perfect
institutions than those which, from the
commencement of their association as communities,
havefollojed the appointments of some wise
legislators. (Emphasis added)
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The upshot of this approach, it seems to Hayek, not only
renders tradition, custom, human experience in general inferior to
"reason", but also that "It is almost an inevitable step from this
to the conclusion that only what is true in this sense can lead to
successful action, and that therefore everything to which man owes
his achievements is a product of his reasoning thus conceived." 5
Hayek alleges that it is to the Cartesian philosophy that we
owe the preference which prevails to the present day for everything
that is done consciously or "deliberately", and from it the
attitude of contempt for tradition, custom, and history in general.
This Cartesian tenet, to Hayek, with its basic assumption
underlying the belief that man has achieved mastery of his
surroundings mainly through his capacity for logical deduction from
6
explicit premises is "factually false".
In order to understand the reason why Hayek rejects Cartesian
rationalism, one must come to investigate Hayek's own account of
human action. This is the topic that now we must turn.
Rule
According to Hayek, human action is never the result of reason
(in the Cartesian sense) alone, people do often act without knowing
why they have to act in the way they are.
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Human action, and human perception too, suggests Hayek, are
rule-guided. As he puts it in the essay "Rules, Perception and
Intelligibility":
The most striking instance of the phenomena from
which we shall start is the ability of small
children to use language in accordance with the
rules of gramma and idiom of which they are
wholly unaware.
and
Rules which we cannot state....do not govern
only our actions. They also govern our
perceptions. The child who speaks grammatically
without knowing the rules of grammar not only
understands all the shades of meaning expressed by
others through following the rules of grammar, but
may also be able to corEect a grammatical mistake
in the speech of others.
In short, people like the child do act in accordance with
inarticulated rules and also have the capacity, in general, to
perceive or classify others' actions according to rules.
In the realm of, say, practical skill, there are a lot of
social practices or human actions which are not the products of
Cartesian reasoning but are, nevertheless, successful in the sense
of fulfilling human expectations. It is not, to Hayek, the case
that the more rational(in the Cartesian sense) we are, the more
successful we necessarily will be.
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one does not need to deliberate on the mechanics of cycling
before one is capable of riding a bicycle. Nor does one need to
know in a billiard-ball game how to construct the mathematical
formulas that would give the directions of travel that would score
points and, among these, would indicate the one or more) that
would leave the balls in the best positions before one is a good
billiard-ball player.9
These examples dispute the Cartesian tenet. They show that
the ability to act successfully is not necessarily derived from the
ability to explicitly demonstrate by reason why it is successful.
Or, to use Gilbert Ryle's classical statement, there is a realm of
human phenmoena that is most appropriately regarded as knowing
how without knowing that.10
Nor is it theoretically possible for us to make explicit all
these action/perception-governing rules. Rather, Hayek contends
that, from an epistemological standpoint, it is both logically and
practically impossible to make all these rules explicit. These two
are among the most important limitations of our knowledge which
refute the validity of Cartesian rationalism.
However, the recognition of these limitations of human
knowledge does not render us impotent. As we have indicated, rule-
following action is one of the modes of behaviours for successful
human pursuit. Also, Hayek would make us believe that the proper
use of these limitations of human knowledge will, in certain




Before we can fully grasp the substance of these Hayekian
contentions, an understanding of Hayek's conception of human mind
and its relationship with social development is essential.
Mind
We can find the most complete statement on the body-min
problem of Hayek in his book The Sensory Order. 11 But it is no
appropriate here to fully assess the significance of this work
Rather, I would think that there are two important and relate
conclusions concerning the characteristics of the human mint
arrived at in Hayek's treatise which are of particular relevancy to
our problem here.
a. mental events vs. physical events
The first point to be noted, which is also the central
question of the body-mind problem asked in The Sensory Order by
Hayek, is in what way shall we distinguish our knowledge of
physical events from knowledge of mental events.
Our knowledge of physical events aims at giving an adequate
explanation of the relations among physical objects we encounter in
the external world. The progress of the physical sciences, Hayek
contends, has shown that in order to give a satisfactory account-
of the regularities existing in the physical world the physical
sciences have been forced to define the objects of which this world
12The Ignorance Thesis
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quA%1sL5 increasingly in terms of the observed relations betty eE
these objects, and at the same time more and more to disregard th
way in which these objects appear to us."12
Nowadays, physicist has to speak of visible
light and
audible sound if he wants to refer to the objects of sense
perception or how these objects appear to us. To him, light and
sound are now defined in terms of wave motions or, in general,
when dealing with physical events which cause definite sense
experiences, he concentrates on imperceptible events, like
electricity, magnetism, etc., for instances, which do not directly
produce specific sensory qualities .l3
The reason for this is that the objects of the external world
do not regularly differ in their effects on each other in the same
way in which they differ in their effects upon our senses. There
seems to exist two distinct orders in our world: one physical and
one phenomenal. There exists no simple one-to-one correspondence
in the sense that several objects or events which in one order
belong to the same kind or class will also belong to the same kind
or class in the other order.14
Thus, the question that in what way is our phenomenal or
sensory order organised itself cannot be answered even if we have
full knowledge of the external physical order. An inquiry into the
ways and means by which our sensory perception classifies the
objects it acquaints is a separate and legitimate task. To answer
the problem of correspondence .between our mental events and
physical events without first resorting to answer the question of
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zne ways our sensory order are organised is imnossibla
b. human knowledge and human experiences
The above standpoint in the body-mind problem enables Hayek to
draw one important conclusion which has great significance to his
social and political philosophy: that there is a realm of
irreducible mental knowledge which cannot be regarded as directly,
or mechanically, corresponding to physical knowledge. In
explaining or understanding the relations between man and man or
between man and thing,i.e. social or human phenomena, it is
impossible not to resort to this realm of mental knowledge because
human activities are largely influenced by human perception which
in turn is organised according to our mental order.
As Hayek argues:
People do behave in the same manner toward things,
not because these things are identical in a
physical sense, but because they have learned to
classify them as belonging to the same group,
because they can put them to the same use or expect
from them what to the people concerned is an
equivalent effect. In fact, most of the objects of
social or human action are not objective facts in
the special narrow sense in which this term is used
by the Sciences and contrasted to opinions, and
they cannot at all be defined in physical terms.
So far as human actions are concerned the things
are what the acting people think they are.
Also, Hayek tries to illustrate this point further by




a definition which is to comprise all instances of
the class will not contain any reference to its
substance, or shape, or other physiial attribute.
An ordinary hammer and a steamhammer, or an aneroid
barometer and a mercury barometer, have nothing in
common except the purpose for which men think they
can be used.
It must not be objected that these are merely
instances of abstractions to arrive at generic
terms just as those used in the physical sciences.
The point is that they are abstractions from all
the physical attributes of the things in question
and that their definitions must run entirely in
terms of mental attitudes of men toward the things.15
In effect, Hayek is suggesting that our knowledge of human
action and social phenomena are necessarily tainted by our
experience and perception. There exists no transcendantal
standpoint on human thought from which we could develop a
conception of the world that is wholly uncontaminated by human
experience. It is in this sense that John Gray characterises
Hayek's fundamental epistemological insight as Kantian.16
It is important to note that in saying so, Hayek is not
endorsing dualism in the body-mind problem in theory if by
dualism, we mean that every instance where a man observed a
peculiar and distinct process, it must be due to the presence of a
corresponding peculiar and distinct substance. However, Hayek's
position here does recognise that for practical purposes we shall
always have to adopt a dualistic view, meaning that it is
impossible to substitute statements about particular physical
events for statements about mental events without thereby changing
the meaning of the statement.17'
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The reason that Hayek only endorses a dualistic view for
practical purpose is, it seems to me, that ultimately Hayek
recognises those mental events, or the mental order, as part of the
physical order but it is a part whose precise position in that
larger (physical) order we shall never able to determine, because
we cannot directly observe how the mental order, or our mind---
which is defined by Hayek as a particular order of a set of events
taking place in some organism and in some manner related to but not
identical with, the physical order of events in the environment 18--
-is formed by its physical elements, but can only infer from them.
Also, such an inference is necessarily incomplete because, and this
is the second important conclusion I find very relevant to Hayek's
social and political philosophy, it is logically impossible for the
mind (itself performing the function of giving meaning to external
stimuli we encounter in the external world by a process of
classification according to the order of the mind) to classify or
to give meaning to itself. Therefore, a complete understanding of
the mind by ourselves is logically contradictory, so thus a
complete self-understanding. This is the point I shall try to give
a fuller explanation now.
c: classification and the limits of explanatior
to oegln with, nayek's sceptical Kantianism is evidenced with
his disavowal of any concern as to how things really are in the
world. Rather, he suggests that
a question like what is x? has meaning only
within a given order, and that within this limit it
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must always refer to the relation of one particular
event 19to other events belonging to the sameorder.
The mind, or the mental order, is the mechanism by which we
classify some of the stimuli we perceive and encounter in the
process of interaction with the external world in relations to
other stimuli we perceive or to our pass experience, and thus
giving meaning to those stimuli in the context of that mental
order. 20
As such, there exists an absolute, or logical, limit to our
mind, or to any mechanism of classification and explanation,
because:
any apparatus of classification must possess a
structure of a higher degree of complexity than is
possessed by the objects which it
classifies.... therefore, the capacity of any
explaining agent must be limited to objects with a
structure possessing a degree of complexity lower
than its own.... it means that no explaining
agent can ever explain objects of its own kind, or
of its own degree of complexity, and, therefore,
that the human 21 brain can never fully explain its
own operations.
This conception of the logical limitation of our brain or our
capacity of self-understanding'is supported, as suggested by Hayek,
by Georg Cantor's theorem in the theory of sets according to which
in any system of classification there are always more classes than
things to be classified, which presumably implies that no system of
classes can contain itself. 22
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it is expedient here also to point out another limitation of
our mind or of our accepted mode of explanation before we proceed
to assess the significance of the constitutional ignorance of our
mind in the theory of spontaneous order.
Since explanation must be carried out within a given order, we
can never explain a particular thing by itself, but must resort to
generic explanation, or explanation of the principle, meaning that
it always refers to features which are common to all phenomena of a
certain kind. In the case of simple phenomena, e.g. physics, we
can have very elaborate explanations by taking into account all
relevant variables and thus making very precise prediction and
explanation possible. However, in the case of complex phenomena,
such as meteorology, biology, or social phenomena, the number of
variables which would have to be taken into account is so great
that the human mind, as a matter of fact, just cannot effectively
manipulate them into a coherent whole, thus making precise
prediction and explanation impossible. To these phenomena, we can,
according to Hayek, only make pattern-explanation or negative
prediction. In this respect, law-like explanation is impossible
at best, we can try to construct certain patterns on the base of
certain existing knowledge of related fields together with some of
the variables of the complex situation that our mind can grasp to
make sense out of the phenomena. This undertaking does not create
new knowledge (but only derivative patterns of the existing
knowledge), yet it is useful because it helps us to understand, as
far as possible, the complex phenomena, and enables us to regard
those events which fall outside the range of the pattern we
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construct as irrelevant to the complex phenomena we try to
explain.23 This is the practical limit of our human mind and
knowledge.
Ignorance and Social Development
iiavliir, uisuusseu nayeK s critique or the Cartesian conception
of reason, his emphasis on the importance of rules which are not
necessary derviation of reason in successful human pursuits, and
the two important conclusions drawn from his theory of the mind, it
is now possible to evaluate how these discussions contribute to
Hayek's thesis of ignorance in his theory of spontaneous order.
a: Hayekian mind vs. Cartesian rationalism
If Hayek's account of the mental order is correct, it is
obvious that Descartes's tenet of the supremacy of explicit reason
is false. In effect, Hayek's contentions challenge Descartes's
position in two related ways.
Firstly, Descartes is mistaken to believe that only logical
deduction from explicit or demonstrable premises is true or
rational. Rather, it is something more complex and thus less
explicable or demonstrable by the human mind than those "clear and
distinct" premises that enables one to conduct such "rational"
undertakings. The truthfulness of our reasoning is presuppossed
by, to use Michael Polanyi's phrase, a higher but tacit
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dimension.Z4
Secondly,Descartes's presupposition that explicit or concrete
knowledge is superior to abstract knowledge and is therefore better
as a guide to success should be, according to Hayek, reversed. The
concept of mind as advanced by Hayek suggests that it is abstract
knowledge that is "primary".25 The fact that we can make sense out
of our perception or reasoning does not mean that it is ultimatlely
concrete knowledge that enables us to do so. Instead, it is the
existence of an abstract pattern or framework which constitutes the
order of our mind that makes us possible to classify and make sense
of the particular events we come across in life. Thus, it is
abstract knowledge that guides us, at least in part, to success.
More fundamentally, the absolute and practical limitations in
our capacity of explanation render any expectation to completely
master our environment and ourselves absurd. Thus, any social and
political philosophy aiming at a complete change of our society,
tradition and human nature is necessarily mistaken and, if being
put into practice, disastrous. The Cartesian presumption, that man
has achieved mastery of his surrounding mainly through his capacity
for logical deduction from explicit premises, among others, must be
discarded.
An equally important insight in Hayek's concept of mind is
that since the mental order is distinct from the physical order, it
is inevitable in our understanding of human action that mental
entities must always remain the last determinants to which we can
penetrate, and that we cannot hope to replace them by physical
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facts. This insight challenges any undertaking which tries to
replace the study of human phenomena wholly by devices we learn
from physical sciences. At least, in economics, attempts to try to
establish a price theory by physical facts by classical economists
have failed. Instead, the subjective account of the price
mechanism given by Carl Menger and developed by his Austrian
successors has enhanced the understanding of how the price
mechanism works and solved the paradox of the price which has
plagued the invisible hand explanation of the market for a long
time.26
b: evolutionary rationalists
`the rerutation of Cartesian rationalism by Hayek does not mean
that he rejects rationalism as such. On the contrary, we can infer
from his position in epistemology a distinct conception of
rationalism. He calls his conception of rationalism as
evolutionary, or critical, rationalism to contradistinguish
Descartes's construtivisit or navie rationalism.27
Indeed, he has pointed out that his attack upon Cartesan
rationalism aims to improve the use of reason in human undertaking
rather than to destroy it. What he tries to do is to argue, along
the line of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume, that to make reason
as effective as possible, it requires an insight into the
limitations of the powers of conscious reason and into the
assistance we obtain from processes of which we are not aware.28
It is in this sense that Hayek regards himself as a rationalist,
but of an evolutionary kind.
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It should be clear from what I have said that the conception
of evolutionary rationalism puts much emphasis on abstraction.
Given our logical and practical limitations in cognitive
activities, evolutionary rationalism recognises that abstract
concepts are a kind of means to cope with the complexity of the
concrete world which our mind is not capable of fully
comprehending.
But unlike constructivist rationalism, this kind of
abstraction is not something which the mind produces by processes
of logic from its perception of reality, but rather a property of
the categories with which it operates---not a product of the mind
but rather what constitutes the mind.29
Also, to Hayek, this abstraction is not conceived as a
property confined to conscious thought or concepts. Rather,
Whenever a type of situation evokes in an individual a disposition
towards a certain pattern of response, that basic relation which is
described as'abstract' is present.30 Thus, abstraction is a
characteristic determines action long before it appears in
conscious thought or is exnrpssMM_
Reason, thus, does not operate independently. It always works
within a context of abstract relations. It is. the combination of
concrete reason and abstract relations that enables us to determine
what to do, and its function is essentially to act as restraint or
prohibition. Or, as Hayek puts it,
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Reason is merely a discipline, an insight into the
limitations of the possibilities of successful
action, which often will tell us only what to not
do. This discipline is necessary precisely because
our intellect is not capable of grasping reality in
all its complexity.31
Evolutionary rationalism, thus, envisages that the bes-
utilization of reason is to regard reason as in a context of
abstract relations within which and with the the combination of
which it can operate in a way to help us to detemine our courses of
action. But such a determination should be essentially prohibitive
in nature given the complexity of the reality and the
constitutional ignorance of human cognition. It is by this process
of trial and error, prohibitions and conjectures that the
effectiveness of reason grows. It is in this sense that
rationalism is evolutionary.
c: the task of science
Hayek's theory of mind also suggests that to explain is
basically not to explain the essence or ultimate reality of any
concrete events. Rather, it is the task of explanation in
particular, and of science in general, to relate the concrete
events adequately by an abstract, or higher level,
framework/pattern in order to make these concrete events meaningful
or useful. These frameworks are subject to refutations and
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replacement by better frameworks and are therefore, in this sense,
dynamic. Any change in the higher level framework will necessarily
change the significance, position or meaning of those concrete
events thereunder. Science, or explanation, progresses by
replacing less convincing or useful frameworks by more convincing
or useful ones. It must be noted however that such replacement or
change does not necessarily originate from higher level framework.
We may change our conception towards particular elements, which
must be presupposed by a new tacit framework, of a theory first and
then eventually come to the conclusion that the old theory is no
longer adequate to explain the phenomena at stake.32
a: mind and social development
oimiiarly, the mind, which performs the task of classification
and explanation for us, is also a dynamic system. External
circumstances may force upon the mind to change some of its
presupposition either consciously or not consciously. The mind, as
a mechanism to help us understand ourselves and the external world,
has to produce various models or maps approximating the
external environment by its distinctive ways of ordering to make us
adapt to our surroundings. In this process, the mind, and also
ourselves, acquires/acquire certain experience which is, in the
final analysis, the ability or disposition to observe, transmit,
develop or spread those practices which help us persist.
The mind does not develop independently. Rather, in Hayek's
words, it
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is an adaptation to the natural and social
surroundings in which man lives and that it has
developed in constant interaction with the
institutions which determine the structure of
society. Mind is as much the product of the social
environment in which it has grown up and which it
has not made as something that has in turn acted
upon and altered these institution s.33
From here, Hayek concludes that mind and society develop
concurrently. There cannot be such a thing as a transcendeantal
mind that develops outside a society and shapes the development of
that society independent of it. Consequently, abstract
individualism is false or a disguise of constructivism or Cartesian
rationalism. There is no human nature as such, Or at least, there
is no reason to suppose that human nature is not shaped by social
development which in turn is influenced by man.
Also, though abstract knowledge is important, it is not always
the case that we can make it explicit. However, without a
conscious understanding of such knowledge, we still can benefit
from it in human action. Many morals, for example, are honoured in
action by man and are, presumably, beneficial to man. Yet man,
while honouring the morals in action, is not necessarily conscious
of the existence of these morals, not to say conscious of why these
morals are good or right. The transmission of such morals, or many
other social practices, could always be done by our capacity of
knowing how, not necessarily of knowing that.
Similarly, we can make use of the price mechanism to determine
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whether we should spend our money or should produce a certain good
to our benefit without knowing why the price changes or what
constitutes a change of price in the market. The utilisation of
practical knowledge, or knowledge of particular time and place,
does not presuppose an explicit understanding of the abstract
knowledge behind them.34 Therefore, the primacy of the abstract
thesis in Hayek's theory of mind does not only refute Catesian
rationalsim, it also helps us to examine the way we make use of our
practical knowledge for succussful human pursuits, though always in
a manner of knowing how without knowing that. It is in this sense
that our reliance on spontaneous order, or on abstract, tacit
framework of knowledge extends our power of control or of achieving
success. Yet one must also be aware of the fact that the nature of
this abstract or tacit dimension renders us impossible* to know it,
ind ourselves too, comprehensively and thus limits our power of
35
,ontrol to society and human phenmena.
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CHAPTER THREE
HAYEK' S THEORY OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER
THE EVOLUTION THESIS
Introduction
If the ignorance thesis of the theory of spontaneous order
tries to delimit the capacity of our intellect, the evolution
thesis is an attempt to account for how social order or structure
can be formed without a deliberate unifying plan, and, how the
order selects its own practices and rules.
In what follows, I shall try to make clear these two parts of
the evolution thesis in Hayek's theory of spontaneous order. Also,
I hope in the course of this chapter to show how the theory of
spontaneous order requires certain built-in attributes in the rules
of conduct in order to make a spontaneous formation of order
possible.
These attributes are of paramount significance to the
preservation of spontaneous order by human deliberations which is a
subject I shall discuss in chapters four and five.
The Formation of Social Order: A Central Ouestinn
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A certain degree of orderliness is essential for the existence
of any kind of society. This seems to be plain and self-evident.1
However, what accounts for the formation of social order?
Surprisingly, it is not always the case that social scientists
do give sufficient attention to this question. Some approaches in
the social sciences which, like Cartesian rationalism, build upon
the false assumption that human reason alone is able to make, or
has already made, mankind achieve mastery of their environment,
even assume away this question. Thus their validality is eroded.
It is in economics that Hayek first systematically points out
how some approaches in the social sciences, such as equilibrium
analysis---a method endorsed by many economists, among others, by
assuming human omniscience, have dismissed the question of the
formation of social order and how, as a result, they discard the
subject-matter of economics in particular and of the social
sciences in general.2
I think it may be expedient to spend some space here to
discuss this problem in order to see the relevancy of Hayek's
criticism of Cartesian rationalism and constructivism.
Equilibrium analysis postulates that the state of equilibrium,
i.e. a state in which there exists a correspondance among
expectations of different social actors, is the starting point for




equilibrium can we discover the relationships among the essential
variables of a particular social context to help us to judge how,
in real life, a particular social order is formed or, how far does
the real soiial order differ from the optimal order and to suggest ,
accordingly, ways for improvement.
The theory of competitive equilibrium, Hayek contends, is just
one example. The adherents of this theory seem to assert that it
provides the appropriate model for judging the effectiveness of
competition in real life, and one of the major assumptions of this
theory is that we must have complete knowledge of the relevant
factors on the part of all participants in the market.3
If this is the case, there is no need to account for th
formation of social order, for we have already known, by possessio
of complete knowledge, what determines the formation of socia
order. What we have to do is to curb any deviations from the stag
of soical equilibrium in real life and to exhaust all the logica,
consequences of our knowledge of equilibrium.
There will be, then, a science of social engineering. There
will also be a subject-matter for the development of the logic of
equilibrium analysis. Furthermore, there may well be a subject
matter for psychology to examine how and why certain expectations
of the social actors are formed.*
But there will be no subject-matter for economics because we
have already known how the state in. which the most economical use
of social resources is achieved (i.e. the state of equilibrium).
29The Evolution Thesis Chapter Three
Also, apart from psychology, there well be no subject-matter for
the social sciences because we have already known how society works
and operates.
Besides these absurd conclusions, Hayek, with his adherence to
the ignorance thesis (see chapter two), has good reasons to reject
such an approach in social studies.
More specifically, Hayek points out that the error of
equilibrium analysis rests ultimately on the confusion to
substitute the definition of social order (a state of equilibrium
is itself the highest degree of orderliness of social order) for
the formation of social order. As he puts it succinctly,
The statement that, if people know everything,
they are in equilibrium is true simply because
that is how we define equilibrium. The assumption
of a perfect market in this sense is just another
way of saying that equilibrium exists but does not
get us any nearer an explanation of when and how
such a state will come about. It is clear that if
we want to make the assertion that, under certain
conditions, people will approach that state, we
must explain by what process they will acquire the
necessary knowledge.
Thus, we must explain how social order could have be formed.
Two Kinds of Order
It may be necessary to point out that Hayek never contends
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that all orders are the results of spontaneous interaction of their
constituting elements. Instead, even in a spontaneous social
order, Hayek regards certain organisations (e.g. goverment, army,
companies) with centralised, clear and specific plannings for their
own action, as indispensible.
In many fields, Hayek would admit, the resulting orderliness
are arrived at by human deliberations. Such as in engineering, in
some scientific experiments and the like. Also, in certain
assembly, in parades for instance, the orderliness of them are the
result of human command.
However, at the societal level, Hayek asserts that the
formation of a social order can never be solely the result of human
design quite the contrary, it is largely the result of human
action which follows no unifying or deliberate social plans.
The resonas are, firstly, every social actor has his/her own
intentions or purposes, there is no reason to assume that their
purposes must necessarily be compatible, or the same. Secondly, it
is practically impossible for us to know all the details-of the
expectations of our fellow social participants at most, one can
only know a little portion of the needs or expectations of all
social actors. Thirdly, people do always change their plans or
expectations for various reasons, it is highly unlikely that we can
know all relevant factors leading to change of expectations. And
fourthly, since a complete self-understaning is impossible, and
since our perception and action are governed by rules which are
logically impossible for us to know them all, it becomes logically
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not possible for us to know or understand the socical order
synoptically. At least, we cannot fully know ourselves and our
fellow actors. If this is the case, we cannot have social plans.
which can take into account of all relevant factors leading to the
formation of social order, not to say to carry out a synoptic plan
assuming complete knowledge.
The Spontaneous Formation of Sorial nrdar
a: dispersed knowledge
Given that a complete possession of relevant knowledge is not
possible, it seems hardly disputable that everybody may well
possess some information or knowledge that others do not know or
at least know less well.
It seems also always true that the different information
possessed by different individuals may mean differently to them
under different (changed) circumstances. The knowledge of the
existence of a dish of food stored in my refrigerator means nothing
to me if I do not want to eat, but may mean a lot to me after I
have starved for some days.
Also, the environment in which mankind lives is always subject
to change, albeit it is stable.enough to permit lives grow, no
matter the change are the result of physical events, of a lapse of
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time, or consequences of human actions, is evident.
Furthermore, the different knowledge possessed by different.
individuals are not necessarily scientific knowledge or rational
knowledge in the Cartesian sense. Many of them are, Hayek says,
knowledge of time and place. Here is what he says in detail:
there is... .a body of very important but
unorganized knowledge which cannot possibly be
called scientific in the sense of knowledge of
general rules: the knowledge of particular
circumstances of time and place... .We need to
remember only how much we have to learn in any
occupation after we have completed our theoretical
training, how big a part of our working life we
spend learning particular jobs, and how valuable an
asset in all walks of life is knowledge of people,
of local conditions, and of special circumstances.
To know of and put to use a machine not fully
employed, or somebody's skill which could be better
utilized, or to be aware of a surplus stock which
can be drawn upon during an interruption of
supplies is socially quite as useful as the
knowledge of better alternative
techniques... .The shipper who earns his living
from using otherwise empty or half-filled journey
of tramp-steamers, or the estate agent whose whole
knowledge is almost exclusively one of temporary
opportunities, or the arbitrageur who gains from
local differences of commodity prices---are all
performing eminently useful functions based on
special knowledge of circumstances of the fleeting
moment not known to others.
These dispersed knowledge are, as suggested by Hayek, socially
useful. The problem is, we could not know beforehand in what ways,
at what time, are they useful to us. Nor will any physical law
tell me when and whether this dissertation will be published and
become a best-seller and hence makes me a wealthy person.
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No one can know all these dispersed knowledge, though we know
that at times they are useful. At best, only the individual, with
his Judgement or special information or skill, knows how to utilise
them when there is a chance to do so, and with risk.
If we want to design a social order by means of central
planning with scientific knowledge alone as a tool, we will
necessarily miss most of these socially useful knowledge.
More importantly,there is no deliberate or rational plan that
because they are deliberate, can take an adequate or comprehensive
account of these dispersed and unscientific, non-rational
information/knowledge. Even a deliberate plan aiming at the
elimination of these dispersed knowledge cannot-do (though any such
undertaking is disastrous).
Consequently, it is impossible to disregard the dispersed
knowledge possessed by different individuals which may be very
useful for the society to adapt to changes. So also, the necessity
to leave room for this kind of, at times conflicting, and very
often dispersed, knowldedge makes the formation of all social order
necessarily subject to the influence beyond rational knowledge.
Here, we come to the very important question in economics as
well as in the formation of social order. By virtue of what, one
may think, will these dispersed knowledge be co-ordinated or
utilised in order to achieve a correspondence of individual
expectations? Or, in what way will these disperesed knowledge be
communicated in order to make social actors aware of their
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existence and utility?
b: co-ordination: the price mechanism
The very mechanism which performs the task of co-ordinating
the socially dispersed knowledge and which makes a formation of
economic order without a centralised plan possible is, according to
Hayek, the. price system. This system is also the cheapest possible
system of resources allocation.
The following passage is one of the best passages from Hayek
which illustrates how the price mechanism performs its function of
co-ordination:
Assume that somewhere in the world a new
opportunity for the use of some raw material, say,
tin, has arisen, or that one of the sources of
supply of tin has been eliminated. It does not
matter for our purpose---and it is significant that
it does not matter---which of these two causes has
made tin more scarce. All that the users of tin
need to know is that some of the tin they used to
consume is now more profitably employed elsewhere
and that, in consequence, they must economize tin.
There is no need for the great majority of them
even to know where the more urgent need has arisen,
or in favor of what other needs they ought to
husband the supply. If only some of them know
directly of the new demand, and switch resources
over to it, and if the people who are aware of the
new gap thus created in turn fill it from still
other sources, the effect will rapidly spread
throughout the whole economic system and influence
not only all the uses of tin but also those of its
substitutes and the subsitutes of these
substitutes, the supply of all the things made of
tin, and their substitutes, and so on and all this
without the great majority of those instrumental in
bringing about these substitutions knowing anything
at all about the original cause of these changes.
The whole acts as one market, not because any of
its members survey the whole field, but because
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their limited individual fields of vision
sufficiently overlap so that through many
intermediaries the relevant information is
communmicated to all. The mere fact that there is
one price for any commodity --- or rather that local
prices are connected in a manner determined by the
cost of transport, etc.---brings about the solution
which (it is just conceptually possible) might have
been arrived at by one single mind possessing all
the information which is in fact dispersed among
all the people involved in the process 6
From this passage, we can see that one of the major functions
for the price mechanism is informative. It performs-this function
in the following way.
It registers both the effects of changing objective conditions
and the reactions of transactors to these changes in particular,
it registers the ever-changing expectations of market participants
by attaching to each kind of scarce resource a numerical index
which cannot be derived from any property possessed by that
particular thing, but which reflects,or in which is condensed, its
significance in view of the whole transactional structure.
With this, it becomes possible that the transactors can know
how to respond to the changing environments without knowing why
there are such changes. Thus, it becomes possible too that we can
co-ordinate our action without the need to possess complete
knowledge concerning all relevant factors affecting our economic
order.
Even more important is that the price mechanism also indicates
which way for the cheapest, or most efficient, utilisation of our
resources. As is suggested by Hayek in the passage, the changing
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demand/supply of one factor of production will register its impact
in the price system making the transactors know that they have to
economise that particular factor of Drodurtinn
Or, as Hayek claims elsewhere,
Almost any product can be produced by a great many
different quantitative combinations of the various
factors of production, and which of them will be
the least costly, i.e. will involve the least
sacrifice of other goods that might be produced
with them, is7indicated by the relative prices of
these factors.
Consequently, by virtue of the existence of the price system,
we can achieve a state of efficiency and orderliness, i.e. a state
in which there is a corresdpondence of expectations of the actors
by the cheapest means without any central plan, nor any issuing of
order by the central master, or without the need to acquire
coplete knnw1PooP in a particular contex
All that the actors need to do is to observe the price system
and to utilise their dispersed knowledge accordingly. The result
of any particular manifestation of the market order is not
foreseeable, because we do not possess enough knowledge to know
when and why a certain factor of production will change or affect
the actions of people. Therefore, the result of the spontaneous
market order is unintended.
Such a system is self-regulative because any change concerning
or relating to scarce resources will be registered in the price
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system which in turn induces the actors to response accordingly
Subsequently, the market order is also self-regulative because
the transactors within are acted in accordance with the self-
regulative mechanism of the price
If anyone tries to hamper the price of this self -re
gulative
function by limiting its changes or by fixing the level of price,
it will no longer be able to inform us about the relative changes
of our environment, or to indicate the most efficient
way to
utilise our resources without distortion. Thus, we are deprived of
our guide in our social action. Unless we presume that we have
already possessed complete knowledge, such interferences of the
price system may well result in chaos.
C: co-ordination: rules
It is true that Hayek regards economics as one of the most
elaborated sciences in explaining the self-regulative or
spontaneous nature of social order.8 Yet, it is also true that his
ambition is to extend his insights in economics to social sciences
in general. His theory of spontaneous order is the very attempt
that tries to establish a sophisticated case for the contention of
spontaneously fnrmPc enninl ardor
In doing so, the first difficulty Hayek will inevitably face
is, unlike in economics, social action as such has no price system
to be followed in order to .arrive at a high degree of
correspondence of individual expectations.
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Norman P. Barry captures this point nicely when he says "it
is not obviously the case that there is an equivalent mechanism
[i.e. a system equivalent to the price system] -to produce that
legal and political order which is required for the co-ordination
of individual actions."9
In order to overcome this difficulty, Hayek proposes a very
important idea here: that spontaneous orders result from their
elements obeying certain rules of conduct.10
To Hayek, a certain system of rules of conduct is the very
mechanism that co-ordinates human action as such. It is not only
an analogue to the price system in economics, but, in fact, is a
more general and abstract entity embracing the price system itself
because the existence or maintenance of the price system is
dependent on a particular type of rule-following behaviour.
What exactly is this system of rules of conduct? How, or in
what ways, does it co-ordinate social actions leading to the
formation of a spontaneous order?
d: the rules of spontaneous order:
transmission and coordination
It is evident that not all kinds of rules are conducive to the
formation of spontaneous order. Some rules, as pointed out by
Hayek,11 will only lead to disorder.
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Also, except in extremely, perhaps unrealistically, simple or
primitive organisations, a command-type order also needs particular
rules as supplements to the execution of the leader's 12
commands.
But this type of rules are necessarily subsidiary to commands,
filling in the gaps left by the commands and, thus, are
instrumental only to a specific or assigned task.
These two types of rules are emphatically not the rules of
spontaneous order, because they must be, firstly, capable of
forming an order, and, secondly, capable of bringing a
correspondence among unknown,dispersed, and, perhaps, conflicting
ends which necessarily exist in any society.
Social rules which are capable of co-ordinating the actions of
various individuals into an orderly pattern have to satisfy certain
requirements first.
The first thing is, there must be a process of rule
transmission in order to make the social actors capable of
following rules of conduct conducive to spontaneous order. This
process is, to Hayek, essentially a process of imitation and
identification. 13
The facts that any average new born infant can soon learn to
recognise and to imitate complex movement/sound patterns and that
most individuals are capable of following the successful practices
of others, though with difficulties at times, show that we, as
human beings, are capable of transfering rules of conduct from one
individual to another, or, even, from one generation, group, etc.,
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to another.
The details of the operation of this process do not concern us
here, these are the jobs for theoretical psychology. It may be
sufficient to our purpose here if we can agree that in practice, we
do have the ability to transfer and follow rules.
However, rules other than rules of spontaneous order may also
be transferable. Therefore, besides the process of transmission,
the rules of spontaneous order have to possess other attributes to
perform their distinctive function of co-ordination.
Since, as has been shown, it is impossible in a social order,
or. any complex order, for any one to know the expectations of its
actors in entirety, the rules of spontaneous order must not be end-
dependent, or, in other words, aiming at particular result. The
correspondence of individual expectations in the social order has
to be achieved by rules that can, at the same time, satisfy or
guide different purposes. It is in this sense that Hayek
characterises the rules of spontaneous order as purpose-independent
and abstract.
Of course, one may say that the rules of spontaneous order
have a very clear and specific purpose: viz., to preserve the
spontaneous order. Thus, it is also true to say that they are not
absolutely purpose-independent.
But there are at least two reasons that Hayek would prefer to




Firstly, it is not necessary the case that we know that these
rules can lead to the formation of a spontaneous
order that we put
them into practice, (if this is necessary the case, the
intellectual capacity of our mind should be much greater than that
of the Hayekian mind permits), rather, it is our practice of
certain kind of rules which tends to approximate a correspondence
of individual expectations without a unitary plan that induces us
to discover the relationship between this kind of rules and the
subsequent order. We can only describe their relationship by
mental reconstruction because it is not specificable by ourY
intuitive perception. In other words, the spontaneous order is not
intended by any of its individuals, i.e. none of them has designed
the formation of it. It is in this sense that we call the
spontaneous order an "abstract" order.
Secondly, since the rules, like the price mechanism, are able
to apply to an unknown and indeterminable number of persons and
instances because they are independent of any particular purposes,
they can satisfy different, or even apparently contradictory
purposes. In this sense, it may be better to regard them as
purpose-neutral.
e: spontaneous order recapitulated
and some attributes of its rules
it may now be convenient to have a recapitulation of the
distingusihing properties of spontaneous order in order to have a




In the first place, in order to be spontaneous
such an order
must be self-formed and self-regulative. In
other words, a
spontaneous order is necessarily an endogenously formed order.
Unlike a designed order, in engineering for instance, the resultant
orderliness of a spontaneous order must be the
outcome of the
interaction among its own elements. The working of the price
mechanism and the role of those abstract rules of
conduct in a
society are, therefore, indispensable for a spontaneous order.
Secondly, whereas a designed order (taxis is a simple order,
a spontaneous order must be theoretically able to accommodate
unlimited degree of conplexity.15 This is so-because otherwise the
vast amount of dispersed knowledge and the ways they are related to
each other cannot be accommodated.
Also, a spontaneous order must be an abstractly related order.
More specifically, this implies the following:
The significance of the abstract character of such
orders rests on the fact that they may persist
while all the particular elements they comprise,
and even the number of such elements, change. All
that is necessary to preserve such an abstract
order is that a certain structure of relationship
be maintained or that elements of a certain kind
(but variable in number) continue to be related in
a certain manners.
Since such an order aims essentially at the maintenance of an
abstract relation rather than any particular result, and since no
individual knows beforehand what such a particular result will be
16
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spontaneous order is therefore a purpose rode endent order.
Of course, the maintenance of such an order depends upon its-
elements acting in certain regular manner. These regularities, or
rules, are maintained chiefly because, according to Hayek, those
who did act in certain ways had within the resulting order a better
chance of survivial than those who did not.17
The contents of these regularities may differ in different
contexts. But it is certain that so far as the contexts are
spontaneously formed, these regularities or rules must be
compatible with those distingusihing properties of spontaneous
order. Since these rules aim at the maintenance of spontaneous
order, they have to possess the above mentioned properties, i.e.,
abstractness, purpose independence, and complexity (meaning that
the rules have the capacity to coordinate indeterminable number of
expectations) as their attributes.
Be that as they may, they do not exhaust all the attributes of
the rules of spontaneous order. Also, these rules may be divided
into different categories and one of which (i.e. the law of liberty
or rules of just conduct) is of special importance to a free
society. The relationship between the law of liberty and
spontaneous order, together with the other attributes that we can
rind in the rules of spontaneous order deserve a whole chapter for
tiscussion.
But before I close this chapter, a few words must be said on




Criterion for the Natural Selection of Rules
in Spontaneous Order
As has been said the environment in which we are dwelling is
always subject to change. Thus, at times, it renders oui
conventional practices obsolete.
Also, human beings are fallible, our practices and conscious
rules may, contrary to our expectations, be unsuitable for our
adaptation to the surroundings.
All these may well lead to a change of rules and practices
either consciously or not consciously, if human beings still manage
to persist.
In the light of this, one may legitimately ask: according to
what will the rules of spontaneous order evolve in order to cope
with new challenges? Or, in what manner will the process of
selection of rules be conducted?
These are central questions for any theory of evolution but
which have not been so far received adequate treatment. It is, it
seems to me, the ambition of Hayek's theory of spontaneous order to
answer these questions, at least partly.
Restrained by his methodology, Hayek would never say that we




process of spontaneous order.18
However, Hayek contends that through human deliberations, we
can establish certain necessary conditions for the evolution of
social rules of spontaneous order. If this is the case, though we
cannot design the spontaneous order according to our will, we still
can eliminate practices which are necessarily detrimental to it.
It will be a great contribution to human knowledge if Hayek is
successful. I shall try to look into such a contention in chapters
four and five.
Besides that, one can also note that Hayek does give some
general description on how the process of selection of rules works
in the field other than human design. His famous statement, which
is borrowed from Adam Ferguson, the results of human action but
not of human desgin, tells us that the selection of rules is
conducted largely in a manner that no individual can determine the
actual result, though it is the interaction among individuals that
these rules are orignated and selected.
rurcnermore, it seems to be implied by Hayek that ultimately,
the natural (as contrast to the deliberate) criterion for the
selection of rules seems to be: success, meaning that only those
rules which can, in reality, increase the chances of survival, or
19persistence, of the group will be selected.9
More specifically, Hayek uses the population of a group as a
standard to assess the adaptability of that particular group. He
believes that social practices which lead to the production of the
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desirable number" of a group are the most adaptable practices and
will thus be selected. At times, he seems even to suggest that the
criterion for the selection of rules lies in whether the rules,
given the kind of environment in which man lives, can secure a
greater number of the groups or individuals practising them would
survive.
But, the foregoing criterion and its elaboration suggested by
Hayek is problematical,
Firstly, it seems tautological to say that successful rules
will be selected, since the process of selection is aiming at
choosing rules which can adapt to the environment, i.e. rules that
have to be successful.
Secondly, Hayek never defines what is "the desired number" for
a group. Perhaps, the state of "the desired number" for a group is
similar to the state of equilibrium in a market. If this is the
case, as a criterion, " the desired number" is not dissimilar to
success and is therefore a tautology rather than a practical
criterion for us to asses which rules should be selected.
Thus, the suggestion of success or " the desired number" in the
selective process is a definition rather than a criterion for the
selective process of social evolution.
The suggestion of a greater number of a group as a criterion
is also questionable. As has pointed out by Karen I. Vaughn, what




a population with a large number
of births and high infant
mortality be considered more successful than
one with fewer births
and more children surviving to adulthood? ood. Or would a large,
relatively young population with a short life span for any one
individual be considered more successful
than a smaller population
where individuals live longer productive
lives? Is that, at
present, the country with the greatest number of people, i.e.
China, more successful than the United States, which is regarded as
the most advanced industrialised country by many?20
Perhaps, apart from the vague greater number suggestion,
there is nothing more Hayek can do with respect to the natural
criterion, or if you like, the general description,
of the
selective process of cultural/social' evolution. We need something
more complex than the selective process of social evolution before
we can fully explain this process just like we need something more
complex than the human mind before we can fully articulate the
operation of it. Since our mind cannot logically and practically
fully articulate the selective process, but only can mentally
reconstruct it by our partial knowledge of its elements and
operation, that may be all we can infer from our knowledge.
If so, there arises a problem. On what ground can we say that
spontaneous actions will necessarily lead to the formation of an
order? Though empirically, we may agree that this is always the
case, it cannot, theoretically, rule out the possibility of
spontaneous disorder. Also, according to what criterion can we say
certain rules or practices are more- successful? I shall touch on




Nevertheless,. assuming Hayek's two theses
of the theory of
spontaneous order are largely tenable, we still have to examine the
claim of Hayek that through our mental reconstruction of the nature
of spontaneous order and it's selective
process, we can identif1
certain attributes of our rules as necessary conditions for the
preservation and promotion of spontaneous order.
And since these
rules can be subjected to human delibert
tion, we are able to
eliminate those rules that are directly contravening these
attributes by certain negative tests. Consequently, at least, part
of the selective process can be manipulated
by man making our
defence of an efficient, spontaneous, and free
order within the
reach of reason.
This is the subject that I shall discuss in the next chapter.
The Law of Liberty
Chapter Four
CHAPTER FOUR
HAYEK' S THEORY OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER
THE LAW OF LIBERTY
Introduction
Assuming that the ignorance and the evolution theses are able
to explain how social order is formed without a unitary plan and
without the assumption of human omniscience, it still remains to be
shown how spontaneous order should be morally accepted as a social
order. To Hayek who values individual freedom so much' and
believes that spontaneous social order requires freedom, it is his
burden to work out those liberal implications in his theory of
spontaneous order.
Also, since Hayek believes in certain constitutional human
ignorance, he has to prove how in the context of human ignorance we
still can make use of reason to defend or improve our individual
freedom, making the ideal of individual freedom realisable, at
least partly or negatively, by human deliberations rather than
totally by fate.
The law of liberty developed by Hayek is an answer to the
above two tasks. The attributes and the required tests possessed
by the law of liberty are regarded as necessary conditions for
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spontaneous order.2 Also, they are our very safeguards to freedom.
Without them, the character of any spontaneous social order will be
"indeterminate."3 I regard this as the third thesis of HaYek's
theory of spontaneous order.
in what follows, I shall try to delineate how the law of
liberty helps to promote spontaneous social order and why it is
conducive to our freedom. I shall also claim that this third
thesis of spontaneous order helps Hayek to conclude that
spontaneous social order is a free, just, and most efficient social
order which can possibly be realised by man. These are the reasons
why spontaneous social order should be accepted.
Attributes of the Rules of Spontaneous Order
We have already identified three attributes of those rules of
spontaneous order in chapter three. They are: 1) abstractness, 2)
purpose-independence, and 3) complexity.
In a sense, these attributes are closely related.
The abstract rules of spontaneous order exist long before we
are conscious of them. It is only through a process of
articulation that we begin to consciously know them rather than
only honour them in practice.4 This process of articulation is
essentially a process of mental reconstruction of the relationship
of some abstract rules with other equally abstract rules or with
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the overall social order. Such a relationship is not intuitively
specifiable.
They are abstract or not easily specifiable partly because
they do not aim at concrete results. In this sense, they are
independent of any individual or particular purpose. Only in
conjunction with particualr purposes will they help to produce an
(unknown) particular result. In this sense, they are guidelines
for individual actions rather than a means to a particular end.
As guidelines, the abstract rules of conduct mainly co-
ordinate different individual actions and expectations. Their
function of co-ordination is made possible by the ability of the
abstract rules to register all relevant changes occured or to
delimit what the actors can count on and what cannot. As such,
they can possess the capacity to co-ordinate indeterminable number
of expectations. Thus, the three attributes are closely related.
But they are not the only attributes of the rules of
spontaneous order.
The fact that they can co-ordinate complex interaction is also
due to another attribute of the rules of spontaneous order: a
delimitation of a boundary of legitimate or protected domain of
each person or, in short, a boundary for private property. As
Hayek states:
The understanding that good f ences make good
neighbours, that is, that men can use their own
52The Law of Liberty Chapter Four
knowledge in the pursuit of their own ends without
colliding with each other only if clear boundaries
can be drawn between their respective domains of
free action, is the Basis on which all known
civilization has grown.
Such a delimitation of individual legitimate domain, like all
other attributes of the rules of spontaneous order, is not concrete
in nature or fixed once and for all. Rather, the rules will only
spell out certain conditions under which individuals will be
prohibited to infringe or, in other words, they will state out as
clearly as possible in what conditions an individual can be free
from external interferences. The question that according to what
will these conditions be delimited will be discussed in the next
chapter.
The reason that the boundary for private property in the
abstract rules must not be concrete are: firstly, our
constitutional ignorance necessarily renders us incapable of
guaranteering a fixed or concrete distribution of property without
arbitrariness; secondly, since our world is not a static world, new
circumstances may well demand new expectations or adjustment of old
delimitation of property, thus making an once-and-for-all
delimitation impossible or undesirable.
Thus, the attribute of "private property" is important in at
least two senses: firstly, it registers how our regularities in
behaviour adapt to the circumstances we are in and, secondly, it
gives us a guideline to develop our life plan by telling us what we
can count on and what we cannot.
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in aoaltlon, we can identify two more attributes of the rule
of spontaneous order in Hayek's theory. One is that every rule ol
this kind will in intention be perpetual another is, only rules
regulating our actions towards others are relevant.
To say that these rules are intended to be perpetual is not to
say that they are not changeable. It is against the claim that we
should sacrifice principles for the sake of expediency that Hayek
proposes this attribute. If we want to preserve the informative
and prohibitive functions of the abstract rules which make a
spontaneous order possible, we must not sacrifice them for the sake
of particular desirable results for some. Abstract rules of
spontaneous order do not secure desirable results in every
occasion, but the universal and general application of them is the
only way to secure a spontaneous order within which a maximal
coincidence of expectations is possible. To follow a rule only
when it can secure a particular result is, to Hayek, a
contradiction in term. Except that we are omniscient, otherwise,
to follow a rule can never secure a particular result absolutely,
but only can guide us to what we can count on. Further, if Hayek
is right here, to sacrifice principles for the sake of expediency
will very likely lead to chaos because it will, in the last resort,
abandon all abstract rules which are the only possible guides for
human action that can bring a state of spontaneous orderliness.
The last attribute of the rules of spontaneous order is th
they only regulate actions towards others.
It has been pointed out by some critics of Hayek that abstract
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rules as defined by him might still restrict freedom.7 Also, not
all abstract rules directly concern social order. Thus, only rules
regulating interpersonal behaviour, in other words, rules affecting
individual freedom, will be regarded as rules of spontaneous order.
The practices which a person follows in his private life, or
followed by a particular group of people to which all are
voluntarily committed but obviously would not affect the outsiders
do not in general matter us here, however abstract or coercive they
are.
The Required Tests of the Rules of Spontaneous Order
These attributes are not designed by man. It is, to Hayek,
through a process of social evolution that these attributes of
rules are developed we begin systematically to relate them
together and work out their implications when we find that rules
possessing these attributes are conducive to spontaneous order.
This process of social evolution of rules of spontaneous order
is essentially a process dealing with conflicts of rules which are
unavoidable in all human communities. We do not concern ourselves
in the origins of rules here. Instead, we deliberate on which rule
law tradition, the judicial process of judge-made law is a typical
case of this
There are several tests in this process which are
should prevail in case of rule conflicts and why. In the common
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indispensible for the development of the rules of spontaneous
order. The appplication of these tests is the essential defence
and improvement of the rules of spontaneous order. Together with
the attributes mentioned above, they form the very nature of
Hayek's law of liberty.
In a nutshell, these tests are: 1) the test of internal
consistency, 2) the test of universalisability, and 3) the test of
equality. These three tests are, as shall be seen, closely
related.
a: the test of internal consistency
Since abstract rules are the very devices which man ha:
developed in order to cope with his constitutional ignorance, it iE
thus contradictory to believe that in case of rule conflicts, he
can arrive at an Archimedean point for criticism or selection of
rules of conduct.
To Hayek, all criticism or improvements of rules of conduct
must be immanent criticism.
In other words, since rules exist before we have articulate
them, and since in case of conflicts of rules, we can only settl
the disputes by means of. immanent criticism (which is a way o
articulation), we are, in essence, requiring our rules of conduc
to be consistent with other rules of conduct within the same
system. Thus, the first test of rules of spontaneous order is thu
test of internal consistency.
56The Law of Liberty Chapter Four
By consistency, Hayek does not mean merely logica:
consistency.
Since a spontaneous social order is served by a system of
rules of conduct, it is the common purpose or function of the rules
concerned to secure the formation of such an order. If the factual
circumstances in which a system of rules of conduct exists require
it to incoporate some additional rules in order to serve the same
purpose, even if those additional rules are not logically entailed
by those existing rules, for the sake of internal consistency in
the factual sense, Hayek would contend that this test requires
their incoporation:
if we accept a given system of norms without
question and discover that in a certain factual
situation it does not achieve the result it aims at
without some complementary rules, these
complementary rules will be required by those
already established, although they are not
lnvically entailed by them..
At times, Hayex seems to go so rar as to claim tnat, the
requirement of factual consistency even takes priority over the
requirement of logical consistency.9
The significance of this test is two-fold: 1) since the
coincidence of our expectations is brought about by social rule:
which may not or could not be fully articulated, the requirement of
internal consistency of rules of conduct will retain the benefit
and experiences which are essential for our success of our existing
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practices which are embodied in the rules but not in human reason
Consequently, this test enables us to retain and utilise the wisdom
of our tradition; 2) the emphasis on factual consistency is not
only necessary as a result of Hayek's insights in human ignorance
it also reveals the realistic character of Hayek's theory of
together with individual freedom should be a realisable ideal
Hayek is not interested in constructing a system of ides
pertaining to freedom regardless of factual situations or
circumstances in reality.10
b: the test of nniversalisability
Closely related to the test of internal consistency is the
Kantian test of universalisability, meaning that man should always
act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will
that it should become universal law." 11
It is a widely known fact that the meaning of the test of
universalisability is ambiguous. It has been pointed out that the
examples employed by Kant to delineate how this test works can lead
to different interpretations of the test.12 Also, many philosophers
have pointed out that a lot of maxims which are morally
unacceptable can pass this Kantian test, making this test as a
moral requirement vulnerable.13
Fortunately, all these issues do not concern us here. What we
have to do is to describe Hayek's interpretation of the test and to
relate it to his other tests in the theory of spontaneous order.
spontaneous order, meaning that the ideal of spontaneous order
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As has been shown, all abstract rules of conduct are intended
for universal application. Similar cases must be treated
similarly, we are not going to sacrifice our principles for the
sake of expediency.
However, there are obstacles to such a generalization. To
Hayek, it is not the kind of logical obstacles---that we cannot
uphold maxims which require our observance of certain practices and
yet also require the contrary---that concern him most rather, it
is the obstacle similar to the test of internal consistency that
matters.
If a maxim or a rule is able to pass the test of
generalization in the logical sense, it does not mean that this
rule must necessarily be conducive to spontaneous social order.
Instead, the thing that the test of universalisability concerns
most is whether the rules of conduct which are under scrutiny are
compatible, primarily in the factual sense, with our accepted
system of rules of conduct. This is the case because spontaneous
social order is maintained by this very system of rules of conduct
as a whole, so only rules compatible (in the sense of serving the
same function or purpose of other rules within the same system)
with this system of rules of conduct are likely to serve the same
order.
In essence, we can say that the test of internal consistency
is equivalent to the test of universalisability, though Hayek seems
to stress that the first test deals with the problem of internal
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rules conflicts whereas the latter deals with the problem of
incoporation of new rules.
c: the test of equality
it. is admitted by Hayek that no entirely satisfactory
criterion has been found to define this test, because a law may be
perfectly abstract in referring only to formal characteristics of
the persons involved yet make different provisions for different
class of people.14 But in one sense, this test amounts to the
requirement of equality before the law by subjecting the law to
general application regardless of the status, background etc. of
those involved.
But Hayek does not stop here. He proposes that the following
requirement is a must in order to meet the requirement of this
test:
that those inside any group singled out acknowledge
the legitimacy of the distinction [as drawn by the
law concerned] as well as those outside it.15
As such, it seems that-Hayek is suggesting that the ideal
equality before the law must include, apart from the requirement
general application of the laws, the requirement that all
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Of course, looking at Hayek's political pholosophy as a whole,
one will find that arbitrary but consented will of the majority or
even the whole community does not constitute a legitimate ground
for the acceptance of such a consent. Hayek's attacks upon legal
positisim16 and majority tyranny17 make this point very clear.
ltllb requirement or consent means precisely that when the need
of discriminatory legislation or policy arises, the consent of all,
i.e., those who will likely be affected and those who will not, is
a pre-requisite in order to safeguard the ideal of equality of law
which aims at equally improving the chances of yet unknow people.
Further, Hayek states that this ideal is incompatible with
benefiting or harming known persons in a nrPri i r-tahl n manner .18
In other words, when we try to establish certain rules or
institutions to regulate the socio-economic conditions of a group
of people, these rules and institutions must be general in
character and provide equal chance of improvement for all.
Also, Hayek seems to suggest that the rules of spontaneous
order should be compatible with the requirement of equal liberty
for all because it is the only legitimate ground for a restriction
of liberty by law.19 In other words, the only rational and just
ground for limitation of individual freedom is freedom itself. We
cannot allow one man's freedom to intervene or obstruct another's
freedom. Thus, only equal freedom for all can be compatible with
this-
These three tests must be applied in the case of conflicts of
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rules in spontaneous order. It is partly through these tests that
the rules of spontaneous order are developed and improved. The
attributes of these rules can also be brought about by constant
application of these tests.
It has also been said that any spontaneously arrived at socia:
order needs certain normative rules. Otherwise, we do not know hop
to cope with the case of conflicts of rules. These tests are
formed in the process of developing our normative rules, through
them, a system of laws of liberty, or the rules of law, will be
emerged. Hayek asserts that these rules or laws can be
deliberately altered.20 He also argues that the work of a judge Is
essentially intellectual. 21 Thus, the law of liberty becomes the
cheif instrument by which we can affect the resulting spontaneous
order through human reason.
However, the way we can employ the law of liberty to affect
the resulting order is limited. Since our law of liberty is
dependent upon existing system of rules of conduct which is not
fully articulable and controllable by human reason, this law of
liberty is only an instrument for elimination of rules and
practices which are incompatible with existing or accepted rules of
conduct. The tests here and the properties of the rules of
spontaneous order are only necessary conditions for the
preservation and improvement of the resulting order. It is in this
sense that Havek r_alls these tests as neuativP taetc 22
Later, I shall try to point. out the confusions and problems of
ayek's treatment of the law of liberty in relation to spontaneous
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order. Now, let us see how this spontaneous social order is
related to freedom, justice and efficiency.
Liberty and Law
IV nnyen, liberty and law are inseparable. The reason for
this is that the liberty that concerns Hayek most is a very
specific liberty. It is a social state of affairs, an human
artifact that is the result of human action. It is, in Hayek's own
words, The state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the
arbitrary will of another or others.23
This definition of liberty does not eliminate coercion as
such. It only tries to minimise coercion by eliminating arbitrary
coercion. But what is coercion? And, what makes it arbitrary?
By coercion, Hayek refers to such control of the
environment or circumstances of a person by another that, in order
to avoid greater evil, he is forced to act not according to a
coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another. 24 The
only justification for the employment of coercion is to prevent or
stop greater or arbitrary coercion.
The relationship between law and liberty can be seem most
clearly in Hayek's conception of arbitrary coercion.
As has been shown in his theses of ignorance and evolution-
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social rules are the most important instruments by which
coincidence of human expectations is achieved. Also, it is the
abstract rules of conduct that constitute our ligitimate
expectations and give us certainty in what we can count on and what
we cannot or, in other words, it is these rules that register the
information of the ways by which we adapt to our environment.
Furthermore, it is by these abstract rules of conduct that a
certain orderliness of a society is realised. The general
observance of these rules by the members of a society is the pre-
requisite for the maintanence of such a society within which human
expectations are fulfilled, though the individuals within may not
be able to articulate these rules systematically.
As such. it is not an act of cpercion by others when people
are brought to learn how to follow these rules while enjoying the
benefits of the social order concerned. Also, as has been argued
by Hayek, every society needs some normative rules which aim at the
preservation of the social order to deal with conflicts of rules.
In a spontaneous order, those normative rules, in order to preserve
or imporve those abstract relationships within that order, have to
possess certain properties and required tests. Thus, we cannot say
that the prohibition of those actions which contravene the abstract
rules of conduct or the normative rules (i.e., the law of liberty)
as arbitrary coercion.
On the contrary, it is those actions which contravene the
abstract rules of conduct or fail to pass the required tests or do
not possess the properties of the law of liberty that are
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arbitrary.
As a result, law and liberty are inseparable. And since all
laws have to satisfy the test of equality, it seems that Hayek is
contending for equal liberty.
Before we go to examine the relationship between ,justice and
law, two more points merit our attention here.
In the first place, not only are law and liberty inseparable,
property is also a built-in element in this respect because our
abstract rules of conduct, by delimiting our legitimate
expectations, are in effect delimiting the boundaries of property.
The law of liberty aims, thus, to secure the legitimate boundaries
for property. As Hayek succinctly puts:
Law, liberty, and property are an inseparable
trinity. There can be no law in the sense of
universal rules of conduct which does not determine
boundaries of the domains of freedom by laying down
rules that enable each to ascertain where he is
free to act.
Secondly, the kind of spontaneous order which Hayek defends
requires freedom in the sense just opposite to command.
Abstract rules are guidelines for successful actions, they
alone are not sufficient conditions for conincidence of
expectations. At least, the individuals have to have the freedom
to utilise their dispersed knowledge. Abstract rules can help us
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to decide whether we ought to use our dispersed knowledge in a
particualr instance, but we have to make our decision by ourselves,
not under anyone's command. If not, the abstract rules will no
longer be guidelines for fulfilment of our expectations because
they, in this case, do not reflect our expectations of the
immediate past.26
Justice and Law
Anyone who has acquaintance with Hayek's political philosophy
knows that Hayek disapproves the concept of "socia"l justice
meaning that only certain particular resultant distributions of
goods in society is just. He regards it as a category mistake
because justice can only be an attribute of human conduct, the
resulting distribution of goods in society cannot be just or unjust
because it is not brought by human design, but is the unintended
and uncontrolled consequence of social interaction27 in which skill
and chance interplay with each other.
As such, any resultant distribution of goods by ar
unobstructed market mechanism is not unjust. And, since market
distribution of goods may lead to great inequality of material or
other rewards among different individuals, Hayek's liberalism, like
all major liberal theories, comes to justify, in addition to
freedom, material inequality.28
Be that as it may, there is still a case for justice in
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Hayek's liberal theory.
Since justice is an attribute of human conduct, the attribute
of justice may thus be predicated about the intended results o1
human action. As Hayek says,
Justice requires that in the "treat" of another
person or persons, i.e. in the intentional actions
affecting the well-being of other per ons, certain
uniform rules of conduct be observed. 29
If this is the case, Justice has a close relationship with the
law of liberty.
Like justice, the law of liberty tries to secure a consistent
or uniform system of rules of conduct among individuals. It
intends to eliminate arbitrary rules or coercion by means of its
required tests.
Also, according to Hayek, the law of liberty is subject to
human deliberation. Thus justice and the law of liberty belong to
the same category.
Besides, the law of liberty has a positive claim in justice,
because it aims at improving. equally the chance of all meaning that
it reduces the number of conflicts of expectations by the test of
consistency and the like.
In saying so, however, Hayek is not contending an equal
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opportunity for all in social undertaking, rather,
All the law can do is to add to the number of
favourable possibilities likely to arise for some
unknown person and thus to build an increasing
likelihood that favourable opportunities will come
anyone's way. But though the aim ought to be to
add everyone's prospects, it will normally not be
known whose prospects will be improved by a
30particular legislative measure, and how much.
Since no one knows who will be benefited, therefore, the law
is regarded as equally beneficial to anybody's chances.
Efficiency and Law
To Hayek, spontaneous order is not only a free and just, or at
least not unjust, order, but also an efficient order.
It seems to be more or less a settled question in the
definition of economic efficiency. Economists and political
philosophers alike all refer it to the satisfaction of the Pareto
condition. This condition describes the point of equilibrium at
which it is impossible to make any one man better off without at
the same time making at least one other man worse off. In other
words, no re-allocation of resources can result in an overall
benefit to the group.
However, it is also widely acknowledged that economic
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cLLiciency in this sense can be achieved in any kind of social
order or svstem.
As has been pointed out by an eminent economist, Steven N. S.
Cheung, when this condition is combined with a postulate of human
behaviour, "constrained maximisation," 31 it becomes a logical
conclusion that the Pareto condition will always be satisfied: that
is, if the constraints permit, people will not interact to harm
themselves if they can accomplish something of benefit at
sufficiently low cost, they will work towards that end. It follows
that, when the constraints or limitations facing them change,
individuals will make adjustments until no further improvements are
possible.32 Thus, any social and political arrangements or initial
constraints can equally satisfy the Pareto condition in this
iense.33 This explains why John Rawls rejects the Pareto condition
is an adequate criterion for evaluation of institutional
arrangements.34
In the light of this, it is of course true to say that
spontaneous social order, like any other social order, can satisfy
economic efficiency. But it is also clear that the defence of
spontaneous social order does not depend upon efficiency in this
sense, Hayek would argue, as has been shown, that it is because
this order is also a free and just order that make it morally
defensible.
However, spontaneous social order is more preferable also in a
non-technical sense of efficiency.
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This order allows every individual to use his/her dispersed
knowledge with as little constraints as possible. By virtue of the
requirement of individual freedom, initial constraints will be
reduced to a minimum making individual utilisation of skill and
knowledge greatest. It is in this sense that Hayek regards
35
spontaneous social order as a very creative order.
Also, to Hayek, it is only through spontaneous social order,
which maximise the matching of expectations wihtin minimum
constraints, that incidentally we achieve material affluence in our
modern civilization. 36
If this is the case, Hayek's theory of spontaneous order not
only gives us an account of the formation and evolution of social
order, but also provides a powerful moral foundation for liberal or
But is he successful?
capitalist society
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CHAPTER FIVE
LIBERTY OR EFFICIENCY
THE LAW OF LIBERTY EVALUATED
Hayekian Liberalism: Uniqueness, Strength, and Weaknes
Like all major liberal theories, Hayek's theory of spontaneous
order provides a two-fold justification: one, it explicitly tries
to defend equal individual liberty and, two, it implicitly
justifies unequal socio-economic distribution.
The uniqueness of Hayek's theory is, he tries to establish
this two-fold justification by a social theory and relates it to a
theory of the rule of law. He contends that equal legal protection
of individuals and recognition of human constitutional ignorance
can sufficiently give a foundation for such a justification. But
Hayek is cautious. He does not believe that we can necessarily
realise a free society only by rationality. He never claims that
we can design our spontaneous social order and predict its
particular manifestations. All his manoeuvre only succeeds, he
claims, in establishing certain necessary conditions for
spontaneous order. Thus, deliberate promotion and maintenance of
the order rest upon those "negative tests" developed by those who
are entrusted to resolve conflicts of rules. For the rest, it is
only a process of trial and error in which chance element plays a
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role.
Indeed, some people regard Hayek's defence of liberalism as.
one of the least vulnerable defences. 1 I, on my part, agree that
Hayek's insights in our constitutional ignorance not only integrate
a new perspective to liberalism, but also anticipate some powerful
criticisms on liberalism by the communitarian critics.
Hayek's denial of abstract individualism, for instance, has
enable his theory to be immune from the attack that liberalism has
no social foundation.2 Also, his denuciation of Cartesian
rationalism and his emphasis. on the nature of things or on rule-
following behaviour as against crude means-ends (i.e. expediency
can override principle) calculation are, prima facie, remedies to
some major weaknesses in traditional liberal theory which are
currently under heavy attack by some communitarian critics.3
Be that as it may, the uniqueness of Hayek's liberalism is
also, it seems to me, a weakness in his defence of liberty.
Constrained by his ignorance thesis, Hayek never clearly
states the boundary within which individuals can have legitimate
expectations or absolute say. There is no (independent) right-
based demacration of this boundary. The most Hayek would like to
argue in this point is to endorse Paul Vinegradoff's conclusion
that We can hardly define a right better than by saying that it is
the range of action assigned to a particular will within the social
order established by law.4
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However, it is my contention tnat the ways Hayek attempts to
delimit a boundary of legitimate expectation by abstract rules of
conduct or by the law of liberty are far from clear. Also, it
seems to me that the criterion he proposes for delimitation is
question begging and is therefore self-defeating. This is my first
criticism on Hayekian liberalism.
Secondly, I would like to argue that the attempt to reconcile
equal liberty before the law and unequal resultant distribution of
social goods by Hayek is unsuccessful. This is a traditional
attack on liberalism.5 But the way how Hayek fails to rebuke this
attack remains to be shown.
In this last chapter of my dissertation, I am going to
critically assess Hayek's liberlism in light of the above two
contentions.
The Law of Liberty as a Necessary Condition For Spontaneous Order
a: equal liberty vs. factual consistency
The law of liberty proposed by Hayek is a necessary condition
for spontaneous social order. Although, by this alone, a
spontaneous social order will not be achieved, any rule of conduct
or behaviour which contradicts it's properties or required tests is
necessarily detrimental to that order and, thus, also to freedom.
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However, it seems to me that the relationship between some of
the elements in -the law of liberty is at question. This renders
them, as I shall argue, as dubious guidelines for the defence of
freedom.
It is stated that all abstract rules of conduct in a
spontaneous social order must satisfy the test of equality. The
chief requirement in this test is that theoretically, any
delimitation of the boundary of legitimate expectation must have
the consent of all. Only in so doing will the ideal of equal
liberty for all be guaranteed.
On the other hand, it is also a stated requirement in the law
of liberty that any apprasial of our rules of conduct must be
immanent apprasial, and the major criterion is to attain a factual
consistency among the rules within the same system.
Are these two requirements necessarily comfortable with each
other?
We are told that the test of internal consistency must include
factual consistency because the factual circumstances in a society
may oblige the observance of certain rules of conduct which are not
logically entailed by those existing rules of conduct.6
Thus, one may figure that in case of emergency, for instance
invasion by an external power, a free society may well enact law
demanding compulsory conscription for all adults and suspendinj
certain liberties of the citizens for the sake of protecting ii
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wiLnout inrringing the law of liberty even though these new laws
are not logically entailed by any existing law.
By the same token, even in case of normalcy, compulsory
conscription for all adults for a certain period of time is not
contrary to freedom because the free society needs military
?protection or invigilation against invasion.
In saying so, Hayek seems to propose that in enforcing the law
of liberty, we have to recognise certain factual constraints
imposed by the imperfection of human life. But not all factual
constraints are similar to the need of military conscription!
The problem is, how shall we distinguish some factual
constraints as inevitable and others as a concession to expediency
and thus jeopardizing the principle of freedom? Or, in other
words, what constitutes arbitrary coercion?
Hayek does admit that earlier unjust acts or institutions may
support a case in justice for correcting the resultant positions.
But he is apt to add that it is very likely impracticable to do so
unless such injustice is clear and recent. He then proposes that
on the whole, it is preferable to accept the given (unjust)
position as due to accident because redemption of it can rarely be
achieved by generic rules.8 As such, past injustice is not
necessarily arbitrary.
But it seems that Hayek. does not always live up to this
conservative or tradition-bound stance.
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The power of monopoly over the issuing of money by the
governments is by no menas "recent". Nor is it "clear" that which
resultant unjust position is the outcome of the exercise of such a
power. Yet, Hayek makes a radical proposal to solve the problem of
inflation by "denationalisation of money."9 Similarly, his
porposals to reform the existing democracies by separating the
functions of the two Houses of the legislature are no less
drastic.10 He is uncompromising in these aspects. Despite their
existence, these democratic and monetary institutions are, to
Hayek, arbitrary.
Presumably, Hayek will say that these institutions must be
reformed in the ways or spirit as he proposes because they are
unjust or violating the test of equal liberty for all. Hayek even
admits that the possibility to realise these proposals at present
is by no means great. He also concedes that these ideas seem to be
"impractical."11
Then, why does he compromise for other "earlier unjust acts or
institutions" and regard them as merely the result of "accidents?"
Is this a concession to expediency which the requirement of
equal liberty duely rejects? Why should the requirement of
internal consistency in the factual sense prevail over the
requirement of equality? Or, does Hayek implies that the law of
liberty (itself certainly a kind of generic rules) is not really an.
adequate instrument for achieving equal liberty which is claimed to
be a necessary condition for spontaneous soical order? If this is
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so, will not it paradoxical to say that the law of liberty is a
negative defence of freedom?
The people of Hong Kong is now experiencing the problem of
change of factual circumstances. Britain has agreed to concede her
sovereignty over Hong Kong to China after 1997.
We, the people of Hong Kong, all know that the continuation of
our spontaneous social order depends, from now on, very much on the
good will of China. The presence of the influence of China is
certainly an important fact that we dare not to overlook.
If, China is going to maintain our spontaneous social order
only if some privileges are granted to her which we are reluctant
but not impossible to give, shall we accept it on the ground of
factual requirement or shall we reject it because, as rational
beings, we regard such a demand unjust and thus contrary to the
requirement of equal liberty for all?
One may of course query that China's demand is not a fact due
to accident which is beyond human control and has therefore no
bearing on the requirement of factual consistency. But it seems
that Hayek is difficult to argue this way because he believes that
generic rules can rarely change the given positions (between Hong
Kong and China), so, unless there exists a greater authority/power
over China to resist her claim, we, the people of Hong Kong, have
to accept it as a factual circumstance similar to the result of
accident or of human action but not of human design. After all,
the given positions between Hong Kong and China are not results of
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Human aesign either. If this resultant difference of position!
between the two. places is a consequence of past injustice, it is bi.
no means clear and recent.
But does not this violate the requirement of equality for all?
The upshot of my contention is that the attributes and tests
of Hayek's law of liberty fail to give us a clear guideline to
decide what practices are immune from arbitrariness and are
conducive to freedom.
On one hand, the requirement of factual consistency demands us
to stike to traditional practices due to human ignorance or
imperfection. But. the way to determine whether a factual
constraint is legitimate is ambiguous, leaving the apprasial of
past arbitrariness indeterminate.
If the requirement of factual consistency is boardly
interpreted, Hayek's theory of spontaneous order becomes a
conservative and skeptical theory, and may even face the danger of
endorsing every existing practices and instituions as legitimate
because of the demands of factual constrains.
It is in this sense that Norman P. Barry criticises Hayek's
defence of liberty is persuasive only when an evolving system is
already imbued with liberal principles.12
But there is no guarantee that all social order must be imbued
with liberal principles. How should we defend freedom negatively
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in society other than liberal society?
On the other hand, if the requirement of equality is strictly
adhered to, Hayek's theory of spontaneous order may become a very
rationalistic theory which he rejects. But it seems that Hayek's
proposals regarding monetary and democratic reforms are just
products disregarding existing practices and factual constraints.
is mere a way out or this predicament in Hayek's theory of
spontaneous order?
b: the role of the Judge and spontaneous order
The case in the above subsection may be characterised as a
kind of conflict of rules in our spontaneous order, albeit a
special kind. For the tests of the law of liberty are themselves
meta-rules regulating the resolution of conflicts of rules. Yet,
when these meta-rules bring about ambiguities and lead to possible
conflicts of interpretations, this becomes a case of rule-conflict.
We all know that in case of conflicts of rules, the judge is
called for to resolve the conflicts.
Hayek regards the task of the judge as intellectual13 because,
presumably, it involves a task of reasoning since he is supposed to
resolve the conflicts of observing different rules of conduct.
It should also be noted that in his task, the judge should not
follow his own will because he has to reconstruct the rationale of
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the concerned conflicting rules in the light of our system of rules
in order to decide which rule should prevail.
In this process of reconstructing the rationale of our system
of rules, or in other words, the rationale of our social order, the
Judge has to stick to the requirement of our social order in order
to resolve the conflicts.
Thus, Hayek seems to suggest that to resolve the case of
conflicts of rules, to which the conflicts within our laws of
liberty also belong, one has to stick to the rationale of
spontaneous order. 14
If this is the criterion for the judge to resolve rule
conflicts, there are at least twe serious problems.
Firstly, since it is Hayek's contention that the nature of
spontaneous order can be understood only by making inferences from
our rules of conduct, it is obvious that we can never describe the
nature or rationale of our spontaneous order in a clear and
distinct way. The maxim that spontaneous order tends to reduce
conflicts of expectations to a minimum is operationally useless in
this case because it is precisely the way how to resolve conflicts
within the spontaneous order that we want to know. This seems to
me to be an analogue to the assumption of eqilibrum analysis
criticised by Hayek himself. (Cf. chapter 3) Thus, there seems
still lacking in a criterion to help the judge to deal with the
conflict.
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More fundamentally, it is Hayek's contention that the law of
liberty is a necessary condition for spontaneous order through
which we can develop certain negative tests to eliminate practices
detrimental to freedom, it seems to me question begging when Hayek
suggests that the determination of this necessary condition of
spontaneous order depends, ultimately, on spontaneous order itself.
Perhaps, James Buchanan is correct when he argues that Hayek'
extension of spontaneous order arguments from the market processes
to institutional structures is bound to disable the tasks of
criticism and reform. We are left with no leverage in Hayek's
account which might be used against the outcomes of the historical
process. 15
Liberty or Efficiency
If my analysis is correct, there is a very serious proble
with respect to Hayekian liberalism: in view of Hayek's reliance o
market distribution and his failure to provide a clear safeguard ti
individual freedom, what, in reality, is he defending, liberty o
PffiriPnrv
In order to examine this question, I shall propose three
points in the following: 1) I shall argue that Hayek's attempt to
defend market efficiency as against constructivist planning or
intervention by the ignorance. thesis is valid, this thesis
strengthens his defence of efficiency or socio-economic
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inequalities; but 2) I shall contend, it does not follow that he
simultaneously Justifies individual freedom for all because unequal
distribution of socio-economic goods and service may very likely
endanger freedom for some; thus, 3) Hayekian liberalism is, in
reality, defending, at best, unequal individual freedom and, at
worst, justifying efficiency even at the expense of freedom.
a: market vs. intervention
As has been shown in chapter three, the formation of the
market order is due to individual interaction, not to
constructivist design. The price mechanism registers all relevant
changes within the market and gives signals to the participants for
response. Those who interpret the signals correctly and have the
relevant dispersed skill knowledge or resources and react
accordingly will fulfil their expectations which in turn will be
registered in the price mechanism. Those who are not are
frustrated or inuced to change their exectations
Any attemp to determine the price level outside this
interactive and dynamic process is illegitimate except that it is
backed up by omniscient knowledge. Without that, it is arbitrary
because it must leave some expectations or information within the
market unregistered and thus mislead other actors and will very
likely result in a less than optimal condition.
Since, as supported by Hayek's thesis of human ignorance, man
can never be ominsicent, constructivist designs or interventions
into the market mechanism will not only impede market efficiency,
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they will never accomplish their task nor fulfil their goals.
b: equal liberty vs. unequal distribution
However, the justification of market efficiency does not
necessarily justify equal liberty. It is a perennial, and I think
convincing, criticism on liberalism that unequal distribution of
16
socio-economic goods may jeopardize equal liberty for all.
In this regard, Hayek does attempt to give reason to contend
for the contrary.
The most prominent undertaking by Hayek at this point is his
argument to deny any relationship between ability and freedom.
Hayek regards the use of liberty to describe the physical
"ability to do what I want," the power to satisfy our wishes, or
the extent of the choice of alternatives open to us as the most
dangerous confusions of individual liberty, because it opens the
way to unlimited intervention or redistribution of wealth.17
In one sense, Hayek is correct. His claim that the fact that
there is only one way out to save the life of a rock climber has no
direct relevancy to freedom is valid.18
However, one cannot agree with Hayek on two points. The
contentions that ability has certain relevancy with freedom does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion of unlimited intervention.
C. B Macpherson's discussion of positive and negative freedom is
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an excellent example to refute Hayek's claim in this regard.'9
The claim that one has to acquire certain ability before one
can follow the law of liberty does not lead to unlimited
intervention. Nor will the claim that individual freedom requires
some protection against extractive power as defined by Macpherson
necessarily legitimizes unlimited intervention.
Secondly, the requirement of equal liberty does, in certain
sense, relate to ability.
Hayek, like most liberals, regards the existence of government
and the rule of law necessary because our world is not a perfect
world. In order to protect our freedom, we have to punish the
free-riders and those who interfere illegitimately into our private
domain. The institutions of the rule of law and government are
among the devices to protect individual freedom.
If a society is unable to develop such intstitutions, other
things being equal, individaul freedom may very likely be at stake.
The test of equality before the law and the development of
institutions to miminise misrule (democracy, for example) are
essential for the realisation of equal liberty. Any society which
its circumstances endanger the functioning of these institutions
may exploit our.eaual individual freedom.
Of course, we may agree with HayeK tnat tnese institutions au
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not originate from human design. But it is obvious, and Hayek
agrees to this,. that they are subject to human deliberation. Any
obstacle which will impede the protection of equal libetty should
be, therefore, if possible. removed.
But, on what ground can we say that material inequalities are
not obstacles.
Hayek does concede that we have to gaurantee universal
education because modern society is so complex that its citizens
will be very difficult to adapt to it and to understand their own
rights and duties without basic educational training.20 At this
point, Hayek is prohibiting an unequal distribution of a particular
social sevice: namely, education, presumably because education is a
soical institution which can be subject to human deliberation. But
why not do the same to other socio-economic goods and services
then?
Universal suffrage does not guarantee an equal protection of
freedom because, as has been shown by Hayek, the majority, say the
trade unionists in Britain, may come to a position strong enough to
manipulate the way how our legislature enacts laws.
This may well be true. But this also suggests that the
ability to control our social or political resources has relevancy
to our freedom. We cannot presume that the socio-economically
better positioned members of our society would not assert their
influence in our legal and political processes which are subject to
human deliberations to gain advantages. Especially, when Hayek
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admits that generic rules rarely succeed in redressing past
injustice. Is not it empirically true that the better positioned
members are always In occupation of the positions in our legal and
politcal institutions In aenera1?
Consequently, an unequal distribution of socio-economic goods
and service does have bearings on freedom. It may endanger our
equal liberty if the influence of differently positioned members of
our society is different unless we assume that all of us are highly
moral beings, an assumption no sophisticated thinker will endorse.
c: unegual liberty and efficiency
If my criticisms on Hayek are correct, to justify unequal
distribution of socio-economic goods and service may very likely
justify unequal freedom. Thus, it seems that Hayek may, at best,
give warrant to unequal freedom.
But if we insist that Hayek's defence of individual freedom by
his theory of spontaneous order is, in the last resort, a failure,
by boardly interpreting the requirement of factual consistency as
overriding the requirement of equality, Hayek's theory may amount
to a defence of efficiency alone because it believes that, in the
final analysis, it is impracticable to change our initial
constraints.
Perhaps, this last contention is unfair to Hayek, because the
relationship between these two requirements is far from clear. But
it seems to me that a coherent defence of equal liberty and
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efficiency, a contention that contains all the major and noble
aspirations of liberalism, still remains to be established.
With this, I conclude my study on Hayek who, nothwithstanding
my criticisms, remains a major philosopher of our time and whose
ideas deserve the most searching scrutiny.
87Notes Notes to Chapter 1
NOTES
Chapter One
1. See for e.g. the latest treaties on Hayek by John Gray, the
former critic of Hayek who has changed his mind recently, Hayek
on Liberty, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p.viii: A major
theme of this study is that Hayek's work composes a system of
ideas, fully as ambitious as the systems of Mill and Marx, but
far less vulnerable to criticism than theirs because it is
grounded on a philosophically defensible view of the scope and
limits of human reason. and, Norman P. Barry, Hayek on
Liberty, in' Zbigniew Pelozynski and John Gray (eds),
Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy, (London: The
Athlone Press, 1984),p.284: it is true that Hayek has produced
one of the most coherent and systematic defences of classical
liberalism this century.
2. See Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Economics as a co-ordination
_Problem: The Contribution of Friedrich A. Hayek, (Sheed Andrew
Mcmeel, 1977) G. L. S. Shackle, F. A. Hayek, 1899---,
in Pioneers of Modern Economics in Britain, D. D. O'Brien
John R. Presley (eds), (London Basingstoke: Macmillam New
Jersey: Barnes Nobles, 1981), chapter 8.
3. See F. A. Hayek, The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law,
(Cairo, 1955), The Constitution of Liberty, (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1960), Part II, and Law,
Legislation and Liberty,vol.1: Rules and Order, (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1973), chapter 4-6. See Robert L.
Cunninghan, Liberty and the Rule of Law, (Texas: Texas A M
University Press, 1979) for a discussion of Hayekian
jurisprudence.
4. See F. A. Hayek, The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the
Foundations of Theoretical Psychology, (Chicago: The University
of of Chicago, Midway Reprint, 1952, 1976) for appraisals on
this work, see W. B. Weimer D. S. Palermo (eds),
Cognition and Symobolic Processes, vol. II (New York, 1978),
and Rosemary Agonito, Hayek revisited: Mind as a process of
classification, in Behavorism. A Forum for Critical
Discussion, 111/2 (University of Nevada, 1975).
5. See F. A. Hayek, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor: Their
Friendship and Subsequent Marriage, (Routledge Kegan Paul),
and New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the
History of Ideas, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1978), Part Four.
6. See F. A. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies
on the Abuse of Reason, (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979),
and, Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, (London:
Routledge Kegan Paul, 1967), chapters 1-6, and Individualism
and Economic Order, (Chicago: Henry Regsery, 1948), chapters
II-IV.
88Notes Notes to Chanter 2
7. See John Gray, op.cit., and the forthcoming work on Hayek by
Jeremy Shearmur. Cf. also Norman P. Barry, Hayek's Social and
Economic Philosophy, (London: Macmillan, 1979).
8. Even Lionel Robbins's review of Hayek's The Constitution. of
Liberty fails, in my opinion, to give adequate attention to the
theory of spontaneous order. See Hayek on Liberty, in
Politics and Economics, (London: Macmillan, 1963), pp.91-112.
9. See, for example, Robbins's remark on The Constitution of
Liberty: It cannot be said to be easy reading the arguments,
although clear and well marshalled, demand frequent pauses for
reflection, in, ibid. p.92 and Sanuauel Brittan, Hayek, the
New Right, the Crisis of Social Demorcarcy, Encounter,
January 1980, p.31.
10. Joseph Raz's criticism on Hayek's conception of the rule of law
is a typical example in this regard. See Raz, The Rule of Law
and Its Virtue, The Law Quarterly Review, vol. 93 (1977),
pp.195-211.
Chapter Two
1. It is reported that Hayek, now in his 86, is at work revising
for publication the manuscript of a new trilogy entitled The
Fatal Conceit: The Intellectual Error of Socialism. Chapter 4
of this trilogy---The Ethics of Liberty and Property---has
been published in the proceedings of the Mont Pelerin Society
1982 General Meeting, 5-10 September, Berlin. See Gray, ibid.,
pp.142 and 180.
2. The first important epistemological work by Hayek is Economics
and Knowledge which was presented in 1936 and is now chapter
two of Individualism and Economic Order.
3. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, pp.8-34.
4. Rene Descartes, A Discourse on Method, trans. John Veitch,
(Dent:London: Everyman's Library, 1912 rpt. 1975), pp.10-11.
5. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, p.10.
6. ibid., pp.10-11.
7. Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, p.43.
8. ibid., p.45.
9. ibid., pp.43-44. See also Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind,
(England: Penguin Books, 1963), chapter II and Michael
Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, (London Henley: Routldege
Kegan Paul, 1962), chapters 4-5.
10. Ryle, ibid.
11. Hayek, The Sensory Order. See also note 4 in chapter 1. This
89Notes Notes to Chapter 2
much neglected work of Hayek is very important to the
development of his conception of social theory. In
Law Le islation and Liberty, vol. 3, (Chicago: The University
of Chicago, 1979), pp.199-200, Hayek writes: My colleagues in
the social sciences generally find my study on The Sensory
Order uninteresting or indigestible. But the work on it has
helped me greatly to clear my mind on much that is very
relevant to social theory. My conception of evolution, of a
spontaneous order and of the methods and limits of our
endeavours to explain complex phenomena have been formed
largely in the course of the work on that book. As I was using
the work I had done in my student days on theoretical
psychology in forming my views on the methodology of the social
sceince, so the working out of my earlier ideas on psychology
with the help of what I had learnt in the social science helped
me greatly in all my later scientific development. It involved
the sort of radical departure from received thinking of which
one is more capable at the age of 21 than later.
12. Hayek, The Sensory Order, pp.2-3.
15. ldla., p.3. Also, ct. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of
Science, Part One.
14. Hayek, The Sensory Order, pp.3 and 6. Cf. The Counter-
Revolution of Science, p.31: [Science] begins with the
realization that things which appear to us the same do not
always behave in the same manner, and that things which appear
different to us sometimes prove in all other respects to behave
in the same way and it proceeds from this experience to
substitute for the classification of events which our senses
provide a new one which groups together not what appears alike
but what proves to behave in the same manner in similar
circumstances, and pp.39-40, While Science is all the time
busy revising the picture of the external world that man
possesses, and while to it this picture is always provisional,
the fact that man has a definite picture, and that the picture
of all beings whom we recognize as thinking men and whom we can
understand is to some extent alike, is no less a reality of
great consequence and the cause of certain events. Until
Science had literally completed its work and not left the
slightest unexplained residue in man's intellectual processes,
the facts of our mind must remain not only data to be explained
but also data on which the explanation of human action guided
by those mental phenomena must be based. Here a new set of
problems arises with which the scientist does not directly
deal. Nor is it obvious that the particular methods to which
he has become used would be appropriate for these problems.
The question is here not how far man's picture of the external
world fits the facts, but how by his actions, determined by the
views and concepts he possesses, man builds up another world of
which the individual becomes a part. And by the views and
concepts people hold' we do not mean merely their knowledge of
external nature. We mean all they know and believe about
themselves, about other people, and about the external world,
in short everything which dtermines their actions, including
science itself.
Notes
Notes to Chapter 2
15. Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science pp.44-46.
16. See John Gray, Hayek on Liberty, pp.4-5. If Hayek's position
here is tenable, then, Laplace's ambition to establish
Universal Knowledge only by those primary qualities such as
masses, positions, velocities, and forces of ultimate
particles, and Coate's desire to reduce all social sciences to
physcial sciences, are both unfounded. For a good critique of
Laplace's vision, see M. Polanyi, Knowing and Being, (Chicago:
The University of Chicago, 1969), ed. Marjorie Grene, pp.159-
180, in particular, pp.174-179. For a critique of Comte, see
Hayek, ibid., Part Two, 13.
17. Hayek, The Sensory Order, pp.177-179.
18. ibid., p.6.
19. ibid., p.4-5. See also, Gray, pp.5-6. Cf. also Gray,
F. A. Hayek on Liberty and Tradition, The Journal of
Libertarian Studies, vol. IV, No. 2 (Spring 1980), pp.119-137.
20. For a full description of the mental order and how it
classifies external stimuli in relation to its experience, see
Hayek, ibid., pp. 127-131.
21. ibid., p.185.
22. See Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics,
pp.61-62.
23. See Degrees of Explanation and The Theory of Complex
Phenomena, in ibid., chapters 1-2.
24. See Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, and Knowing and Being, passim.
The most elaborate statement on this topic can be found,
presumably, in Polanyi's work The Tacit Dimension. However, it
is a shame for the members of the Chinese University of Hong
Kong that someone here has stolen this book from our library
making us impossible to read this important book.
25. See The Primacy of the Abstract, in New Studies in
Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas,
chapter 3.
26. See Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, (London: William Hodge,
1949) Lionel Robbins, The Nature of Economic
Generalizations, in Philosophy and Economic Theory, eds., F.
Hahn M. Hollis, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979),
pp.36-46 E. G. Dolan, ed. The Foundation of Modern Austrian
Economics, (Sheed Ward, 1976), and L. M. Spadaro, ed. New
Directions in Austrian Economics, (Sheed Andrew Mcmeel,
1978).




Notes to Chapter 3
30. ibid.
31. ibid.
32. Cf. Hayek, Notes on the Evolution of Systems of Rules of
Conduct, in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics
chapter 4.
33. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, p.17.
34. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order.
35. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, pp.41-42.
Chapter Three
1. See E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology, (London,
1951), p.19: It is evident that there must be uniformities and
regularities in social life, that society must have some sort
of order, or its members could not live together. It is only
because people know the kind of behaviour expected of them, and
what kind of behaviour to expect from others, in the various
situations of life, and coordinate their activities in
submission to rules and under the guidance of values that each
and all are able to go about their affairs. They can make
predictions, anticipate events, and lead their lives in harmony
with their fellows because every society has a form or pattern
which allows us to speak of it as a system, or structure,
within which, and in accordance with which, its members live
their lives. Quoted in Hayek, Law, Legislation and Lib1
vol. 1, p.155. Also, through out this dissertation, the term
orderis used in the sense as defined by Hayek as follows: a
state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various
kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our
acquaintance with some spatial or temporal part of the whole to
form correct expectations concerning the rest, or at least
expectations which have a good chance of porving correct.
ibid., p.36.
2. See Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, esp. chapter 2,
Economics and Knowledge. See also The Results of Human
Actions but not of Human Design, in Studies in Philosophy,
Politics, and Economics, chapter 6.
3. ibid., p.92 and p.94. According to Hayek, the generally
accepted view of the theory of competitive equilibrium must
presuppose the following: 1. A homogeneous commodity offered
and demanded by a large number of relatively small sellers or
buyers, none of whom expects to exercise by his action a
perceptible influence on price. 2. Free entry into the market
and absence of other restraints on the movement of prices and
resources. 3. Complete knowledge of the relevant factors on
the part of all participants in the market. ibid., p.95.
4. ibid., p.46.
92Notes Notes to Chapter 3
5. ibid., p.80.
6. ibid., pp.85-86. See also Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Economics
as a Co-ordination Problem: The Contributions of Friedrich A.
Hayek, (Kanas: Sheed Andrews McMeel, 1977). O'Driscoll, Jr.,
even says Hayek's essays on the price system and market are
prolegomena to any future study of economic systems and dynamic
process, p.24.
7. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, p.118.
8. Linguistics is another science which Hayek regards as on a par
with economics in this respect. See in particular Noam
Chomsky's contributions. See Hayek, Studies in Philosophy,
Politics and Economics, pp.34-35.
9. Norman P. Barry, The Tradition of Spontaneous Order, p.11.
10. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, pp.43-46. Cf.
vol. 2, pp.8-11 in particular, see the following statement:
Rules are a device for coping with our constitutional
ignorance, p.8.
11. See ibid., vol. 1, p.44: The classical instance of rules of
the behaviour of the elements which will not produce order
comes from the physical sciences: it is the secound law of
thermodynamics or the law of enthropy, according to which the
tendency of the molecules of a gas to move at constant speeds
in straight lines produces a state for which the term 'perfect
disorder' has been coined. Similarly, it is evident that in
society some perfectly regular behaviour of the individuals
could produce only disorder: if the rule were that any
individual should try to kill any other he encountered, or flee
as soon as he saw another, the result would clearly be the
complete impossibility of an order in which the activities of
the individuals were based on collaboration with others.
12. See ibid., pp.48-52.
13. See Hayek, Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics,
pp.46-48.
14. For examples, see Amartya Sen, The Profit Motive, in
Resources, values and Development, (Basil Blackwell, 1984),
pp.90-110 and Richard Vernon, Unintended Consequences, in
Political Theory, (Feb. 1979), pp.57-73. I apologize for my
failure to present my criticisms against these two respectful
authors here because of lacking in space.
15. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, pp.38-39.
16. ibid., p.39.
17. ibid.,
18. This point is often missed by Hayek's critics. It may probably
be the case that such a negligence is due to their inadequate
Notes
Notes to Chapter 4
apprecipation of Hayek's theory of spontaneous order. See, in
particular, Ronald Hamowy, Law and the Liberal Society: F. A.
Hayek's Constitution of Liberty, in Journal of Libertarian
Studies, vol. 2, no. 4 (1978) and John Gray, Hayek on
Liberty, Rights, and Justice, in Ethics 92 (Oct. 1981), pp.73-
84.
19. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, p.18 pp.
148-150.
20. See Karen I. Vaughn's excellent discussion on this in On'The
Tradition of Spontaneous Order', in Literature of Liberty,
(1982 Winter), vol. V, no. 4. p.10.
Chapter Four
1. For example, Hayek has quoted approvingly the comment of W. H.
Auden on freedom: Liberty is not a value, but the ground of
value. See, Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p.420.
2. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, p.112.
3. See Hayek, ibid., p.45: the fact that most people will follow
this rule [i.e. interanlised pattern of behaviour, for e.g.]
will still leave the character of the resulting order very
indeterminate, and by itself certainly would not be sufficient
to give it a beneficial character. For the resulting order to
be beneficial people must also observe some conventional rules,
that is, rules which do not simply follow from their desires
and their insight into relations of cause and effect, but which
are normative and tell them what they ought to or ought not to
do, also, p.96: It is the factual observance of the rules
which is the condition for the formation of an order of
actions... .The reasons why the rules arose must ....not be
confused with the resaons which made it necessary to enforce
them....if society is to persist it will have to develop some
methods of effectively teaching and often also.... of enforcing
them.
4. See ibid., chapter 5 and Rules, Perception and
Intelligibility, in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and
Economics, chapter 3.
5. See Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order, pp.16-19 and
Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, passim.
6. ibid., p.107 and p.170.
7. ibid., p.101.
8. ibid., p.105-
9. See ibid., p.106, and vol. 2, pp.24-25.
10. John Gray has contributed the best exposition of the required
tests in Hayek's the law of liberty I have ever read. However,
Notes
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it seems to me that the main inadequacy of his exposition is
his neglect of the requirement of the factual consistency in
the tests. which is, I think, very important when we try to
examine and evaluate Hayek's defence of freedom which I shall
discuss in the next chapter. See John Gray, Hayek on Liberty,
p.64.
11. I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of Morals, trans. A. D.
Lindsay, p.421 qouted in Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty,
p.197.
12. See H. B. Action, Kant's' Moral Philosophy, (London
Basingstoke: Macmillan), 1970, pp.21-29. Also, J. L. Mackie
has excellently distinguished three distinctive stages of the
test of universalisability and argued that there is no
necessary connection among the three. See J. L. Mackie,
The Three Stages of Universalization, in J. Mackie P.
Mackie (eds.), Persons and Values: Selected Papers, vol. II,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1985, pp.170-183.
13. See, for e.g., A. MacInytre, After Virtue: a study in moral
theory, (London: Duckworth), 1981, pp.42-45.
14. See Hayek, ibid., p.209.
15. ibid., pp.209-210.
16. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, chapter 9.
17. See ibid., vol. 3.
18. Hayek, The Constitution of Libertj, p.210.
19. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, p.170-
20. See ibid., p.45.
21. See ibid., pp.100-101.
22. See ibid., vol. 2, pp.42-44.
23. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p.11.
24. ibid., pp.20-21.
25. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, p.107.
26. See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, p.29: What is
essential to the functioning of the process is that each
individual be able to act on his particular knowledge, always
unique, at least so far as it refers to some particular
circumstances, and that he be able to use his individual skills
and opportunities within the limits known to him and for his
own individual purpose.
27. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, pp.31-100.
28. Cf. Normal Daniels, Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of
Notes Notes to rhantcr R
Liberty, in N. Daneils, (ed.), Reading Rawls, (Oxford: Basi
29. Hayek, ibid., p.70.
30. ibid., p.130.
31. This postulate asserts that each individual will constantly
seek to benefit himself as much as possible subject to the
constraints and limitations he faces. See Steven N. S.
Cheung, Will China Go' Capitalist'?, Hobart Paper 94, (London:
The Institute of Economic Affairs), 1982, p.30.
32. ibid.
33. ibid., pp.32-33.
34. See John Rawls, Distributive Justice, in Laslett Runciman,
(eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society: Third Series,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell.), 1978, p.65: There are presumably
many arrangements of an institution and of the basic structure
which are optimal in this sense....It is impossible to say that
the many optimal arrangements are equally just, and the choice
between them a matter of indifference, since efficient
institutions allow extremely wide variations in the pattern of
distributive shares.
35. See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, chapter 2.
36. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 1, p.110.
Chapter Five
1. See John Gray, Hayek on Liberty.
2. See, for example, Charles Taylor's excellent critique on
Nozick's liberalism which rests on, as Taylor contends,
atomism in Atomism, in Philosophy and the Human Agency:
Philosophical Papers 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press),
1985, pp.187-2.10.
3. See, for example, A. Maclnytre, After Virtue: A study in moral
theory. For an assessment of the communitarian attack on
liberalism, see Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of
Liberalism, Philosophy Public Affairs, vol. 14, no. 3
(Summer 1985), pp.308-322.
4. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, p.158.
5. See, for instances, Norman Daniels, Equal Liberty and Unequal
Worth of Liberty, and C. B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory:
Essays in Retrieval, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1973.
6. See Hayek, op. cit., vol. 2, pp.105-106.
7 This is. nerhaDS. the reason why Hayek believes there is no
Blackwell), 1975, pp.253-256.
Notes
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incompatibility between compulsory conscription and freedom.
See, The Constitution of Liberty, p.143. Some of his critic:
seem to overlook the requirement of factual consistency wher
they point out that compulsory conscription is a kind of
coercion and is therefore, contrary to freedom.
8. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2, p.131.
9. See Hayek, Denationalization of Money-The Argument Refined,
2nd. edn., (London: Institute of Economic Affairs), 1978.
10. See Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 3, chapter 17.
11. ibid., p.xiii.
12. Norman P. Barry, Hayek on Liberty, p.270.
13. See Hayek, ibid., vol. 1, pp.100-101.
14. See ibid F_, p.115.
15. See James Buchanan, Cultural Evolution and Institutional
Reform, unpublished papers, quoted in John Gray, Hayek on
Liberty, p.70. I do not have the fortune to read Buchanan's
paper. But it seems that the conclusion I arrive at here is
closely in line with his conclusion which is quoted, though
very incompletely, by Gray.
16. See note 5.
17. See Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, pp.16-17.
18. See ibid., p.12. Richard Norman misunderstands Hayek's
position here when he asserts that Hayek is equating the choice
of means to the choice of ends in this example. See Richard
Norman, Does equality destroy liberty?, in Keith Graham,
(ed.), Contemporary Political Philosophy: Radical Studies,
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 1982, p-88-
19. See C. B. Macpherson, Berlin's Division of Liberty, in
Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, chapter V.
20. See Hayek, ibid., chapter 24.
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